THE PHILOSOPHIC FUNCTION OF VALUE

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JONATHAN BLETCHMAN

STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY

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The Philosophic Function of Value

A study of experience showing the ultimate meaning of evolution to be the attainment of personality through culture and religion

BY

NATHAN BLECHMAN, PH.D.

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To
Professor Robert MacDougall

PREFACE

In these days of stress, when every thought is bent towards winning the great war that has become a crusade for democracy, an explanation may perhaps be required of a book on a subject apparently so abstract.

This work has been written from a standpoint of democracy. Its aim is to get close to the life of man, to comprehend the unique restlessness and progressiveness of his experience, to see just how evolution is really a development rather than a series of adjustments. It draws a contrast between a purely biological situation and the thought-situation as the unit of experience. Evolution thus becomes the never-to-be-completed story of human selfhood or soul-life, radiant with moral beauty. The soul of man appears both as the subject and the *milieu* of evolution; "the mind is its own place." Laboratory investigations are no longer all that is necessary; the problem is not one of external interaction, but of experience, and so philosophy must take up the task. Reality itself has imposed its obligation.

Man is more than ready to carry the burden of this responsibility; his whole being reaches out towards this philosophical task as the fulfillment of his most imperious want. He too, like the innumerable creatures that struggle for existence, makes his way by his hunger and his thirst. But he hungers with a spiritual hunger and thirsts with a spiritual thirst, that exalt him to a plane of dignity from which he may look down upon and over-

come all things, clearly prophesying his own salvation and that of the world. His vision reveals VALUE as the key to existence.

Worth makes man a partner and a builder of reality. It shows nations groping their way forward and accounts for the essential unity of mankind. It reaches out to describe destiny, but is not too big at the same time to explain the daily course of the average life. It clarifies the movements and the articulations of the thought-situations which are the material of experience. Even in the ordinary events of his life, man is living in the moral situation, his path turned towards an absolute evolution and directed towards reality and destiny.

Are not the materials of democracy made of such stuff? As a man thinks in his heart, so is he; the very categories of his thought proclaim the stage of his evolution. If the mechanicalism that has deluged the world with blood and iron has proved its falsity, is it not time to reach out towards the categories of life? Refined in the furnace seven times over, mankind is reasserting the category of personality, according to which humanity is always an end and never a means only. The soul of man has been remade and life must be adapted to his regenerated spirit. The concern of man is the infinity within, and the infinity without, his sentiments of culture and religion. Evolution's center of gravity is man, and its advancement is continuous creation along lines of personality. Environment is a field of values and not a mere succession of external stimuli. An absolute evolution should be attained in an environment infinitely perfecting itself, re-created by soul and corresponding to it.

The culture that makes religion possible and that signifies the indefeasibility of the individual, cannot by any manner of means be the *kultur* that on the other hand, sweeps the individual off his feet, and loses him with his personal moral responsibilities in the mustering of the mass. The one speaks from the human soul, while the other rumbles from the vast complexity of an all too-efficient machine.

A few words further as to a possible difficulty: the words *idea* and *ideal* are both used to name the rounded content of the thought-situation. How are these to be discriminated and how does one pass into the other? The distinction is not to be grasped from the intellectual content of the thought-units considered in and by themselves. *Idea* and *ideal* are differentiated through the inward appreciation of the self as a whole; the transition to ideals occurs with a moral crisis. When the individual is awakened to a full and complete realization of value, then every one of his ideas is co-ordinated with the moral life, and is seen also as an organic ideal. The quality imposed by value, and the unrest that creates a progressive succession of motives, makes every thought situation an ideal as well as an idea. Thus even in the ordinary moments of life, man is living in an environment re-constructed by ideals.

The inspiration of much of the thought in the pages that follow is gratefully acknowledged in the references. But it is a pleasant duty to acknowledge a special indebtedness to Professor John Dewey's *Studies in Logical Theory*. Furthermore I must express my deep sense of obligation to Professor Charles Gray Shaw whose attrac-

tive and convincing presentation of philosophical truths has extensively influenced the following pages; and to Professor Robert MacDougall whose inspiration towards the construction of a personal philosophical environment, has meant more than I can well express in words.

January, 1918.

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PHILOSOPHIC FUNCTION OF VALUE

The Philosophic Function of Value

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1. *Aim or Thesis to be Proved.* We shall undertake to show that a valuation process functions in life, and that values dynamically express themselves in the structure and in the constructive unfoldment of experience; further, that such values are the landmarks or ends that disclose the self in its own life-career and in its own humanistic world. Our proof will develop in a method of investigation which will consist in a direct examination of life as *das gegebene,* or point of departure or datum, as found in representative situations culminating in self-consciousness with all its implications.

2. *Method and Scope.* Our method will have the genetic attitude, attempting so far as it bears upon value, a reconstruction of these situations and a loosening and identification of contributing factors. Life will be studied in two general units or types, the biological situation and the thought-situation, and a transition, differentiation, and relationship will have to be established between them. Life will be presented as a continuity with especial reference to the possibilities of a continuous evolution that shall not be a vain universal recurrence dogged by involution. Our procedure will be a direct analysis of our "given" as apprehended in its natural activity in evolution, aiming

also for a critical synthesis and a metaphysical insight. Life will be grasped in the mutuality or reciprocity of its environment. The analysis will have to be throughout, a dichotomy exhibiting these mutual factors of inward and outward, neither of which possesses any real significance, except in relation to its other. It will be in the contact of life with its environment, in its locus amidst its environment, that the functioning of valuation will be discovered.

3. *Interests to Values.* Life as a complex or resultant ideally factorable, is not the interactive equilibrium of like forces. There is an inward factor that manifests itself uniquely as a reaction in a process of mutual adaptation, so that life adapts itself to its environment, and, advancing in the scale, it adapts its environment increasingly to itself. In the biological situation, this mutual adaptation is performed by means of interests. Then, as life reaches a fulfillment or a self-discovery of its own intention, the adaptation becomes thought, and interests are displaced by values. The range of interests is limited, and provides for an evolution that might prove to be a vicious circle of mere adjustment. The range of value is unlimited and full of rectilinear promise. In the stage of interests, life can be described as over-experience rather than as experience, for the organism's main intention is continuance without awareness of any larger temporal ends or choice of reactions or deliberate self-consciousness. The notion of experience would tend towards something over or beyond the given organism. Each interest functions on occasion in a full-fledged manner, but there is no cumulative sequence. But when interests are transmuted into value, it is intelligence that is revealed as acting and re-acting.

There is real experience with the possibility of autonomy and its landmarks are the values themselves.

4. *Genesis of Experience.* Thus experience appears in life simultaneously with the genesis and growth of values. At a certain stage of life in the history of evolution, it turns upon itself and reaches self-consciousness in a change that makes experience. Interests give place to values because a self-appreciation of inward ends has arisen; experience really becomes such because there is now an experiencer. It augments progressively by a process of inwardness and of judgment expressing itself not only quantitatively but qualitatively. The preponderance and overbalancing of action is on the side of self-consciousness, and the extension of the environment is modified by an intension of it, the quantitative instrumental relations following and serving the qualitative values. Experience is therefore life deliberately positing its own cumulative ends. Personality is here disclosed in an environment where mind itself furnishes many of the stimuli, or at least modifies all those that are found. Experience really reveals an evolved environment as one of the reciprocal dichotomous factors. So to the conception of experience evolving by means of value, there will have to be added the conception of an ever-developing environment.

5. *The Functioning of Will and the Creation of Value.* The conception of an evolutionary intellectual self amidst an evolutionary environment makes possible the transition from biology to history, that is, to the free creation of ideal ends guiding personal and humanistic experience. It further introduces the will of man as a correspondent to his intellect in meeting the wants of man. For man be-

longing no longer to organisms that function as simple instrumentalities of life in the form of non-subjective over-experience, now appears in evolution as a being characterized by imperious ideal wants. But these wants, creating as they do, the content and progression of the restless round of experience, never can be quite satisfied in the ordinary course of events. The values that correspond to these ideal wants may turn out to be a mere scheme for logical movement, intrinsically non-distinguishable from logical relations, and functioning simply by virtue of a local position in the thought-movement. The great problem of our book is how life attains qualitative and intrinsic values, and how these values function *as such* in experience. This problem continues until it is shown that the totality of wants manifests itself in a single, all-comprehensive want whose satisfaction is accomplished by the willing of supreme value, furnishing a criterion of values, and enabling a functioning of values in experience, mainly prospectively, but, by the linking of a cumulative continuity with the past, retrospectively also.

6. *The Discovery of Self.* Through the sense of want, intelligence discovers itself as a self in all its dignity, and ideally opposed to an environment fluid enough to allow it to realize its own free aims. By an act of will, the self affirms itself and affirms its purpose of actualizing the totality of experience. Such an ideal is, by its nature, of non-empirical content. The willing of the totality as its sphere of activity is the self's most fateful moral event, coming as a moral crisis with the awakening of reason and the dawning of complete inward selfhood. The self

thus finds itself in all possible experience; it transforms all its values with moral *quale*, which is imposed directly or indirectly by its activity in the free building of a universal kingdom of ends. Values are discovered to reside essentially not in things or in impersonal events, but in persons and in their living acts. The subject is seen in the object, and the object is understood in view of its subject.

7. *Value through Culture and Religion.* The criterion or law of values is re-summarized in Kant's categorical imperative which specifically emphasizes the moral *quale*. The two forms of the imperative are shown to characterize, respectively, the culture of the self and the religion of the self. Morality is the link that unites culture and religion. All three of these are the expressions of a value-seeking self and the unification of its experience. Final analysis shows, further, that the constructive values of experience are posited by the self in and through its religion; for religion is the personal dependence upon the claims of totality; it is the category of values *as such*. Its only direct concerns are persons and non-economic interests. Value is thus not only a builder of experience but an instrument wherewith to approach the reality of the whole. But it does not by itself offer a theory of reality.

8. *Value and a Theory of Experience.* Value offers a theory of the evolution of experience. The category of persons is advanced to the chief rank, and an auto-centric reality is exhibited. But this reality is that of a growing evolutionary experience and the charge of subjectivism or phenomenalism would be entirely irrelevant. While not touching the problem of the thing-in-itself, or of reality

apart from knowledge, etc., the philosophy of values, confining itself to experience, exhibits it as infinitely evolving in the two-dimensional aspects of quality-quantity, intension-extension, motive-action, deepening-lengthening, appreciation-objectivity, etc. Value thus brings a sense of personal co-operation with the purposes of evolution and reality. The sense of the personal and the active brings to the basic law of values not a rigoristic devotion, but the joy of achievement.

9. *Value and Related Problems.* The full implications of the conditions under which intelligent will arouses itself to its destiny, will furnish a clew to the solution of many related problems of value. The supreme positing of the self in culture and religion, amidst supreme value, is not only the work of the moral self, but equally of the psychological self, with its biological heritage and its social environment. The recognition of this will enable us to answer such questions as Kant's moral dilemma that duty as such cannot be performed through inclination; or the nature of the inward freedom of acts performed by the authority of society; or the problem of conscience; also the relative moral values of economic and aesthetic interests; the possibility of absolute values in certain institutions; and the fundamental differences of value-content according to era, race, and religion. The problem of the status of the individual is solved by proving his absolute indefeasibility, but nevertheless that indefeasibility is shown to possess a significance mainly, if not entirely, in the co-operative relationship of the individual to society. Value insists upon full recognition of personality, but within the sociality and not outside of it.

10. *Pragmatism and Voluntarism as Complementary.* Our method may be called both pragmatic and speculative. For the functioning of value and its inward-outward, practical, humanistic, character, it will be based on the thought process or experience considered in the unit of the thought-situation, (so named by Dewey, *Studies in Logical Theory,* p. 4). But for the genesis and the moral quale of values, that is, to establish values as values in and for themselves, the inadequacy of the pragmatic method is supplemented by a voluntaristic and monistic conception of experience. Pragmatism, strictly considered, can only construe and verify a particular situation which must, indeed, eventuate in an idea whose test is empirical usefulness. To construe the totality of situations, to satisfy the want or desire that is more than the summation of all particular wants, and that can never be empirically tested except by its general success, the aid of the will must be called in. The two aspects of our method must be shown to be mutually implicated, for the monistic construction of a totality would be valueless without its bearing upon the plural situations. In this reconciliation, the moral crisis will occur. Value will stand out, not merely as an intellectual construction, but as a complete expression and summation of man's life and experience. Finally, it will vindicate the indefeasibility of intellect when the self is shown by means of value to be not merely pragmatically instrumental, but inwardly purposive and unifying amidst the problems of experience.

11. *Outline of the Book.* The development of our thought will pursue the following lines:

(I). The biological situation as an anticipation of

the thought-situation, emphasizing the steps in evolution as consisting of equilibration or harmonization accomplished by the agency of instinctive interests; and furthermore, the perfect reciprocity of life and environment that dictates a dichotomous method of analysis.

(II). The thought-situation and the rise of experience with life recognizing itself and displacing over-experience. Instinct passes into intelligence, and interest into values, and the ego appears as the co-ordinator of its ends.

(III). The passing from biology to history by the operation in life of ideal ends. What valuation is and how it functions in relation to self, freedom, and qualitative experience.

(IV). The logic of experience and the metaphysical analysis of the thought-situation. How the self posits itself in a time-series and imposes a real worth-coefficient or quality, upon values. The dual self, theoretical and practical, or understanding and reason, is discovered as the functioning of the ego in its qualitative moral world.

(V). The moral dilemma of freedom and habit.

(VI). The re-appearance of the persistent contradiction between extrinsic and intrinsic value. The contradiction is solved and intrinsic value is obtained when the self with its mood of want and its prophetic nature posits itself in a moral crisis. The temporal positing discloses meanwhile the stabilizing function and the fulfillment of the non-temporal biological situation.

(VII). The inward movement and the structurizing of the supreme self-positing or the moral crisis. Will, energizing intellect creates a final isolation that produces and standardizes value. This final ideal willing must be that of the non-empirical self over against a non-empirical totality. The mood of want is fulfilled in religion and in culture, and indefeasible self-realization is followed by the joy of labor and achievement.

(VIII) The law of valuation in the evolution of experience takes the form of Kant's categorical imperative. Its two formulations correspond to personality and to totality. The culture and the religion of the self in bestowing real autonomy prove the existence of values that are intrinsic.

(IX) The psychological aspects of the moral crisis and the natural and social history of values. Value really arises as an awakening in a process of re-valuation.

(X) The logic of conscience and its functioning as individual and social, as psychological and moral, and as expressing personality in the task of extension-intension of experience according to values.

(XI) Value and Deity and the religious basis of worth. The value approach to Deity presents the universe as a plastic construction in which persons are indefeasible.

(XII) The differentiation of values into economic and moral. The moral value must be recognized in the very act and flows only from a *Weltanschauung.* Values as the specific field of religion.

(XIII) Our conclusion will attempt to show how value may furnish a practical philosophy of life, an ethical theory; also how it vindicates the self and mediates between the individual and society; finally the reconciliation of religion and science on the basis of worth.

Recalling the central point of our thesis that values are constructive in a progressive evolutionary experience, and our method furthermore of direct approach to life and consciousness in their given condition with a consequent disclosing of the synthetic elements by a dichotomous analysis, we may now proceed to our task of showing what value *is, does,* and *must be,* and how it may be adjudged a key to experience. Experience will be considered as a system of thought-situations and therefore we must commence our investigation with the history and the explanation of the single, or typical, thought-situation.

CHAPTER II

THE BIOLOGICAL SITUATION AND INTERESTS

12. *Life and Organism.* Having taken as the point of departure for experience, the complex of consciousness in the unitary cross-section of the thought-situation, and the genetic or historical development as our method, let us attempt a general picture of its purely biological ancestry or anticipation. There is here no evidence of a thought-situation in the proper sense, there is no self-conscious process. There is, however, a life-situation and that becomes the given, the datum. There is resistance of some kind, and therefore activity. There is, moreover, organization, for that resistance whether to mere passive disintegration or whether in a struggle for self-preservation, is somehow localized, and so even at its lowest terms, an organism. Life expresses itself in an organic process, and appears as its own end. An organism is its own end, whose parts are their own ends, and yet all contributing to the major organic end. (Cf. Kant's conception of organism in Richard Falckenberg's *History of Modern Philosophy,* tr. A. C. Armstrong, p. 409). Life and organism, bringing activity and movement into play, are thus the primal aspects of the biological situation.

13. *The Organic and the Inorganic.* But organism as definitely centralized activity, as resistance for its own end, is also modification of self. Here is the crucial distinction between the inorganic or the mechanical, and the organic or the living. The former is also a resistant

activity, but it can form only an atom, or element, of a group of activities. It does not, indeed, lose its identity as a unit, and, considered as an analytical factor, it is truly incapable of quantitative modification. Nevertheless, it does not operate except to the utter loss of its individuality. It becomes part of a resultant, which again converges into a larger resultant, and so on throughout the whole economy of nature's forces. There is indefinite self-combination, but there is no activity or attempt towards self-maintenance or preservation. *That* would be the description of life, which simultaneously has to introduce a distinction between self and not-self, or internal and external, or—as expressed in its most elemental condition—between organism and environment.

14. *Life, the Irreducible.* In the organic world, there is no longer a general inter-reducibility of forces. Life has introduced the irreducible and the incommensurable. Operating in or with the organism, it will freely utilize the environment and its forces. It will unhesitatingly forego its habitual organic forms if necessary; it will modify itself unstintingly. But it submits in order to dominate. The situation remains its own. It is still the incommensurable. It is not a unit element on equal terms with similar elements in a group. Whatever its modifications, it rather becomes itself the unitary and co-ordinating principle of a converging group of forces. It is both aim and method, and becomes the definite common purpose of activity. While its aim is to continue itself, its method is to express itself. It is *in* its expression, and is the principle of its expression. If the organic processes may be termed forces that interplay with non-organic forces,

it must also be added that they manage to maintain life as the common denominator. Life processes are methods developed by necessity in an organism whose business it always is to utilize or to resist the facts of its externality or environment.

15. *Sentiency, Nutrition, Reproduction.* That there should exisit some other than a quantitive relation between the externality and the selfward-turned internality, that there should be self protective reaction, there must then be the process of irritability or sentiency; there must be replenishment of energy or nutrition; there must also be replenishment of the organism itself, or reproduction. The life process as a whole is one of uninterrupted adjustment and re-adjustment. This is evolutionary growth. Though in the individual, growth is dogged by involutionary diminution or decay, yet the species in the process of reproduction presents a continuous expansion except as checked in the universal conflict of nature.

16. *Life as Internality-Externality.* Life may be characterized as an original diremption of external-internal, of environment and organism. A reconstruction of the life-process will not show these factors as ready-made, except in the case of man in his most evolved, intellectualized, and socialized status. It is in society only, that progress may take the form of imitative adaptation. The life-process in its grander evolutionary phases, however, is just this self-creation in indefinitely varying multitudinous stages by means of this internal-external; evolution is creative not merely of the organism, but inevitably and inextricably of its environment also. Development and evolution are not peculiar to the individual, the organism, the

internality, alone; they are equally and, we may add simultaneously descriptive of the individual's world, his environment, his externality. The growing complexity of organism advancing from the amœba stage can best be studied from the point of view of life's intention, with reference to the mutuality of a growing complexity of environment. The organism is already found as an activity *in* its environment. The division into organism and environment is a logical, working, differentiation, not a rigid, original difference. The evolutionary work of adjustment in passive resistance or active conflict that spells the continuance of life, means the active life of an organism in its environment. The organism has no interest in any other environment, but a very vital interest in its own. Though a bird's-eye view of the totality of evolution may reveal the overlapping of environments, yet, strictly speaking, there are as many environments as there are organisms. It would be humanizing the oyster, or even the dog, to suppose that he has the same world of objects as we. "The more consciousness is intellectualized, the more is matter spatialized." (Henri Bergson, *Creative Evolution,* tr. Arthur Mitchell, p. 189). Life, then, manifests itself as an immediate antithesis of internal-external, of organism-environment. It develops by the interacting reconstruction of both. We are sure of the factors; but, except in the case of our own consciousness, we can only negatively visualize the result.

17. *The Reciprocity of Consciousness and Objectivity.* The biological situation in its myriad units, is not one shifting, evanescent scene among many on the universal stage of life. The various species do not move and live

and have their being in the same theatre of activity. Nor do the humbler creatures share Man's world of beauty and anticipation and fear and conquest. The lamb is still ever led innocently to the slaughter:

> "The lamb thy riot dooms to bleed to-day,
> Had he thy reason, would he skip and play?"

Without more than merely remarking the composite nature of our perception and the character of our perceptual world of objects as an intellectual synthesis, and without pressing metaphysical consequences that might eventuate in a Humian atomism of impressions or a Hegelian thought-context of reality; we may safely assume in all conscious life, even at its remotest origins, and at its lowest ebb, a perfect reciprocity of consciousness and world. In the very conception of a world, it is difficult to escape the centrality of man, because it is our own consciousness that is thus orientating itself. The objects in our world of time and space are cut along the lines of our life-situation, our vital conscious activity. (Cf. Bergson, *Creative Evolution,* tr. Mitchell, p. 153). They are plans and modes of action facilitating the continuum of our experience. They are *our* objects, *our* external world, and yet at the same time our *internal* world. Developing experience bifurcates into these two factors, but the division is purely an ideal one. Our objects, then, are peculiarly our own. Envisaging the whole of life's continuum, there is no reason to apprehend any variation in the process of externalizing internality. Every species has a world of objects peculiarly its own. (Cf. Geo. F.

Stout, *Manual of Psychology,* pp. 265-267). But we should not insist on objects. "In order to follow the indications of instinct, there is no need to perceive objects, it is enough to distinguish properties." (Bergson, *Creative Evolution,* tr. Mitchell, p. 189). Here, the use of the term *object* is symbolic of actuality rather than precisely descriptive.

18. *Self-Creation in an Internal-External Reciprocity by Equilibration.* An analysis of the contexture of the vital movement thus will disclose the activity of continuous self-expression or creation by the mutual reference of the internal and the external. This creation is a synthetic complex of currents of energy. The recoil of the life-current upon itself, its self-insistence upon its integrity, takes the form of an assertive struggle, a conflict with forces of externality. These external forces may be the inorganic, illustrated in the internalizing assimilative activity of the world of plants, when for example, "the nitrates and to a less degree the ammonia, produced by bacterial activity in the soil are taken up through the roots and built up into protoplasm and complex proteins;" (Buchanan, *Household Bacteriology,* p. 180), or they may be the whole round of the purely mechanical forces of nature; or in the redoubling and crossing of the life-current, they may be found to be other organic processes, now considered as external to the one in question. But it is just *in* this conflict that life asserts itself, becoming self-creation in the activity of self-adjustment. The struggle, then, is formative of vital manifestations; the evolution of the internal has been in the midst of an equal evolution of the external. It is a process of harmoniza-

tion and equilibration. The external is taken up into the internal and adapted or harmonized. From a complementary point of view, the internal is just as well externalized. Every organ of adaptation would be a confluence of currents. So also, the simplest independent organism is one whose adaptations have been manifold and progressive; one whose history will uncover many strata of externality that have been adapted with internality. The one-celled animal may be considered the simplest organism. Its very division is the continuance of the vital process in an adaptation of mutuality, a confluence of vital and other forces. Cell-division takes place on account of the decreasing ratio between surface and volume. "Since amoeba takes in food, gives off waste material, and carries on respiration through its surface, the activity of the cell must decrease with increase in size until further growth is impossible. The solution of the problem is the division of the animal into two whereby the ratio of surface to volume is increased." (Robert W. Hegner, *College Zoology,* p. 32). If the cell were not alive, it would break up and dissipate in a simple conversion of forces. But being alive, it maintains itself by a kind of compromise, yielding to, and at the same time using non-organic forces to continue the equilibrating procedure of its life. The radius of internality is constantly lengthening to include an ever widening circle of problems. But the essential nature of the synthesis, which is, in reality, a process of self-creation, is the fact of equilibration, the conflict plus the harmonization. (Cf. Geo. F. Stout, *Manual of Psychology,* p. 245).

19. *Equilibration in the Biological Situation.* How

does life act in producing equilibrium to succeed equilibrium? The biological situation is activity by means of instinct. Instinct is natural, unacquired impulse; it is the very original impetus of life; it is the automatism of the primal, self-active manifestation of life. Without entering into theories of instinct, or taking sides in such disputed questions as to whether instinct is modifiable by inheritance, or whether it may be likened to "lapsed intelligence" or pure mechanism, we may with Bergson define its operation as "using and even constructing organized instruments." (*Creative Evolution,* tr. Mitchell, p. 140). He looks for its concrete explanation in the direction, not of intelligence, but of sympathy. He compares it to the aesthetic faculty that perceives not merely the outwardly assembled, but the mutually organized, the intention, and the significance. What is important is that in instinct, as in the totalizing faculty of man to which it is likened, (Ibid. p. 176) we possess a distinct center of reference, a pivotal point of experience, an internality that develops by meeting and absorbing an externality, an instrumentality that actualizes the imperious self-demand of life for continuance.

20. *The Minimum of Aim that Creates a Situation.* Conscious rationality does not have to be introduced at the stage of instinct, unless one desires to posit a constitutive thought with Hegel, from the viewpoint of the universal, upward, intelligent trend of evolution. But leaving aside the issue between mechanism and finalism, neither of which has to assume that any species or organism possesses the consciousness of a relative rank or place, one must assume that instinct involves a kind of consciousness that

creates a situation, focuses activity, and affirms an aim. This aim in its lowest condition is nothing more than the original, self-regarding aim of the life-process. A second aim, separable only ideally from the first, consists in the necessary forms of life-maintenance and life continuance, namely: sentiency, nutrition, and reproduction. This instinctive consciousness, though not blind to an aim, is probably in no way commensurable with deliberative intelligence.

21. *The Life-World of Aims and Desires.* The action of instinct thus produces a factorable world of aims and desires, of needs and interests. The specific aims are nutrition and reproduction, but in order to obtain leverage in its factorable world, instinct turns upon itself in irritability or sentiency. Sentiency is life in collision, the very lever of action and re-action. (Cf. Chas. C. Everett, *Fichte's Science of Knowledge,* p. 203). As organisms evolve, so does the sentient complex that has charge of the primary aims. Sentiency in a non-deliberative being must be immediately correlated with the direct present needs of the organism; it is the instinctive "yes" and "no," which survives perhaps in some individuals' intuitive first impressions. The organism instinctively establishes a direct and healthy response to pleasure and pain. It proceeds from one state of equilibrium to another, instinctively meeting its adjustive problems, and instinctively finding its life in its environment.

22. *The Reciprocal Development of Organism and Environment.* However, whilst living in its environment, the organism re-constructs that same identical environment by the reciprocal process of internal-external. It

cannot *live* except in an external world. Considering the outlook of life and its differentiated instincts within any organism, it cannot be said that this outside world is given in its fullness to the organism in the latter's stage of a well-defined growth or full-formed maturity. The very process of maturity consists rather in a growing, activistic, relationship to such a world. The living being develops in so far as it finds centers of instinctive interest. These centers are not strictly speaking, found, but are just as well self-creations, formed by the inherent needs of the instinctive processes in that particular phase of evolution. If, indeed, it is the characteristic function of instinct to make use of organized mechanisms, (Cf. Bergson, *Creative Evolution,* tr. Mitchell, p. 140), then it is just the range of those mechanisms and nothing else, that comes within its sympathetic apprehension. In fine, the living know the world in which they live, after the manner of their instinctive consciousness, but they know only their own world. They are not aware of any general external world. They are in creatively conscious relation with that externality only, that facilitates the healthy growth of their internality, making possible the formation of successive, satisfying, states of equilibrium. The fixed, radical, distinction between the external and the internal is a product of intelligent consciousness; to the animal mind, these are but the reciprocal moments of its life.

23. *Logic of Environment Implies Consciousness.* The environment thus evolves with the organism. The evolution of the externality is dependent upon and coeval with the evolution of the internality. The environment as an explanation of species is only a fragment of the life-

story. While species are an adaptation to their environment, it is equally true that their respective environment is an adaptation to them and of their own making. If there is a relative passivity in adaptation, it is to be reckoned on the side of the environment rather than on that of the ceaseless activity which is life. "It is not the action of the environment so much as the reaction of the plant or animal against its environment, which interests us. The living being is a self-active energy persisting under various environments and manifesting his power by modifying his environment and by modifying also his own organism to accomplish his work better." (Wm. T. Harris, *Hegel's Logic,* p. 287). The action and re-action are the forces expressive of the mutual synthesis of life and its conditions.

24. *Environment an Evolution Based on Interests.* The environment *as contributing to organic life* is therefore a self-construction of life, a precipitate due to the nature of the specific instincts that are involved. The surrounding world grows into such in so far as it is based on the life-interests, however "subjectively" unintelligible they may be, of the organism or of the species. Life itself is the grand end that dictates its interests; and pleasure and pain, in the non-existence of the higher mental processes, must give the clue to a world of things, or interest-centers, introducing even qualitative distinctions in the variation of their intensity. While environments are interlaced as indeed species themselves are, if instinct-consciousness suddenly should receive the power of communication, distant species would have as many inexplicable things, or words, as a modern tongue which has to be rendered into

a primitive dialect. The world of nature, then, is not an invariable datum or constant, given equally at every stage of life. In fact the very notion of *nature* is a reflection of a universalizing and poetical intelligence. It represents the completest and most ideal enlargement of man's environment. Its final limits are as theoretical as those of investigation or of human knowledge.

25. *Evolution a Monistic Conception.* The standpoint of the reciprocity of the environment is a revision along the lines of a monistic interpretation, of the usual dualistic conceptions of Evolution, such as those of Spencer. The latter present a development in the history of thought analogous to that of Cartesianism. This was an attempt at an unbiased and critical re-construction of the conditions of knowledge. Nevertheless, while its method was critical and cautious with doubt, it slipped too hastily into the ready-made antithesis of mind and matter. Its inherited attitude was in truth, uncritically dualistic, and, consequently, it could not solve the issues it had raised, but had to bequeath to philosophy, the problem of the psycho-physical interaction. The evolutionary reconstruction similarly began by cutting the essential unity and completeness of life and its phases, and then it tried to take the sum of the parts. It pictured a given environment of uniform nature which it then attached to developing life. This diremption was undoubtedly necessary for purposes of lucidity in order to clear the ground and establish the method itself. In order to vindicate the universality of its application, the procedure had to be rigidly exact, even if its strictly scientific methodology turned it over-much towards the mechanical and the external,

descriptive aspect. A logic founded on the inwardness of life could afford to wait.

26. *Dualism, Anthropomorphic; Monism, Biocentric.* But does not a merely descriptive account of evolution miss the inward intention of life? Apparently it would seem to imply an anthropocentric instead of a purely biocentric conception. It projects our humanistic environment into all life; it settles the earlier forms of life in much too developed a world—our own world in fact. Do we not, thereby, miss the real intention of life? The very description of the evolutionary life-process may mean the introduction of teleology against our own intent. To say that life passes from the incoherent to the coherent, the indefinite to the definite, the homogeneous to the heterogeneous, (Cf. Herbert Spencer, *First Principles,* p. 351), is to argue from the point of view of a world of definitely coherent heterogeneity. It is the standpoint of purpose on a flat plane of environment. On the other hand, the reciprocity of internal-external at any stage of evolution, may have all the coherence, definiteness, and heterogeneity that life demands and requires. Life is not seeking to displace the amœba with a higher group. It expresses itself with equal success in all the organic stages, and the maintenance of a mutual economy of organized life is the perfect success which sums up its total and uniform successes. The reciprocal, monistic interpretation of evolution is by no means opposed to teleology. But instead of imposing a teleology based on the externality of our own environment and so taking environment itself out of evolution, it allows life to suggest its own teleology. Life dichotomizes into internal-external and utters a peculiar

intention in all the environments that it raises. It builds many concentric worlds until, somehow, it finally attains the world of self-consciousness that knowingly encircles them all. (Cf. Herman H. Horne, *Idealism in Education,* p. 3). But whether lowest or highest, it is a real constructive unity, a true mutuality of inward and outward, of self and not-self, with the latter bent to the lines of the former. At last in the self-consciousness of man, this dichotomy may be studied as the me and the not-me.

CHAPTER III

THE RISE OF THE THOUGHT-SITUATION WITH ITS VALUES

27. *Life-Processes Become Experience.* We are now ready to return to our datum, of the thought situation or experience. The latter term may henceforth be used freely because it now receives an inward, as well as an outward connotation. The biological situation in every one of its phases may be termed a general or over-experience related to life itself in general. (Cf. § 3). With the fact of self-consciousness, however, the internal aspect becomes definitely and deliberately constructive. There is a self-regulation of experience in a very large measure, instead of a general over-regulation. Intelligent judgment supersedes instinct and, therefore, values take the place of instinctive interests. It is true that the latter still have their large place as part of the biological inheritance and as part of the life-impulse which is, by no means, all given over to intellection. Nevertheless, these instinctive interests become values when man idealizes them by justifying them to himself. Man reconstructs his own not-me or environment as a reflection of himself, in the mould of his mind. The world is "himself writ large." He is in his world as its biggest component. But this world is not one of pale reflection or appearance. It is a living, ceaselessly active world, pulsating with the life and thought that are in man. Its objectivity is given in experience and not as a thing-in-itself outside experience. Objectivity and

subjectivity still follow the analogy of environment and organism, of external-internal, and are reciprocal moments of experience and not the thing and its photographic copy. In fact, there are no two opposed mediums of physical and psychical to raise an insurmountable objection to the action of the photographic process that requires both original and copy to occupy the same atmospheric medium. Such a dualism would place the point of departure of the argument in a ready-made intellectual, moral, and social world. It would be descriptive of psychological processes rather than of the fundamental process of an experiential logic. It is the method of monistic construction illustrated in the biological process and in the reciprocal evolution of externality or environment, that such a logic will reveal. It will be "an account of the various typical functions or situations of experience in their determining relations to one another." (John Dewey, *Studies in Logical Theory,* p. 19).

28. *In Self-Consciousness Instinct Becomes Intelligence.* Experience is, then, genetically the emergence of the life-process into a situation of self-consciousness. How that comes about,—whether in an intelligible, constitutive, thought-world that precipitates experience in order to objectify and realize itself; or whether in a clash of a mental thing-in-itself with a non-mental thing-in-itself; or whether as an evolutionary psychic ascent occurring abruptly, or occurring in a direct, uninterrupted series,—does not concern our investigation because we are dealing with the logical situation *in actu.* Life still expresses itself in activity. But this activity is no longer an over-experience, a general will-to-live. It has become a self-

will, self-directed by an ego. Instinct is, on the whole, displaced by intelligence, so that experience may be viewed as intellectualized will, or energized intellect. (Cf. Chas. G. Shaw, *The Ego and its Place in the World,* p. 289). The mutuality of inward-outward which constitutes experience now discovers that the life which is at the intersection of these axes of co-ordination has bloomed forth from an impersonal center of reference into a "me." At the same time, the direct, instinctive, and invariable reaction produced by sentiency has been transformed into an indirect and mostly reflective process. The antithesis of pleasure and pain is now an indefinitely varied feeling-tone in a gamut of emotions. The life-process, having turned upon itself, realizing its own workings, apprehending its own ends, is now an intellectual faculty of idealizing and relating. The ideal content is first: the rough unorganized stuff of intellectual experience, of personal environment. Thereupon there must follow in a logical succession, judgments of simultaneity, succession, and anticipation, and time-forms are the result. Substantives joined to predicates by temporally variable copulas, now rise to form an experience-content. Bergson contrasts *homo sapiens* with *homo faber* and emphasizing the latter makes intelligence the tool-making function, "the faculty of manufacturing artificial objects, especially tools to make tools." (*Creative Evolution,* tr. Mitchell, p. 139). But is not the *homo faber* really the instrumentality of the *homo sapiens?* The tool, though it may be experimentally evolved, is an actualized ideal, a realization of a desiderated function. The desideration itself points to an idealized end.

29. *The Reciprocal Genesis of the Elements of the Thought-Situation.* However, in all this far cry up to intelligent experience, the skeleton-form of the biological situation still holds. In this, the highest phase, that of logical judgments, as in all the other phases of life that conception cannot reproduce point by point, there is no world of objects that is given to be copied or duplicated in experience. If experience is photographic, it is reproductive of its past situations, but not of objects outside itself. Its world of objects is given in the environment that it finds in the reciprocity of internal-external and which now comes as a series of logical judgments. Each and every object is a center of interest or at least has a genetic interest-character. The equilibration of conflict in the harmonization that is constructive of things is a process of ideation. The temporalistic form makes possible a present, or ideal beginning, and an invariable succession. It thus gives fixation to the point. (Cf. Chas. C. Everett, *Fichte's Science of Knowledge,* pp. 227ff., 231). The sensuous judgment, which is the material of experience (a genetic inheritance of the race sunk in the sub-conscious, therefore apparently passive and automatic) immediately adds the spatial point to the temporal point. A series of spatial points thus is initiated. The temporal line—before and after—yields the spatial line which is just as well "before and after." Spatiality proceeds to planes or surfaces in the mutual intersection of lines, and to solidity in the mutual intersection of planes. The psychologist may demur and claim that this process refers only to a perceptual copying by a gradual filling-in of dots and lines. But the logic of the genesis of experi-

ence does not know of life's having to go outside of itself to the purely and unrelatedly physical, in order to formulate itself. The percept, as such, is only an individualized point of reference. It is a conceptual world, perfectly uniform for purposes of intercommunication and action, that the race possesses. If a material world is insisted upon, it is more in line with the evolution of the environment, to explain it as life turning outward (describing matter in terms of mind) rather than as an unknowable with a mysterious affinity for consciousness. Objectivity is the obverse side of subjectivity. Both are the reciprocal moments of equilibration that has now attained intellectuality. Objectivity is the product of the movement of judgment as the latter is vitalized by the interests of its conceptual environment. It is the reciprocity of experience. It is construction or creation, rather than reproduction. As ideational and conceptual, it is true self-creation.

30. *Experience Constructed of Things and Relations.* Experience is made of typical situations that eventuate in a geometrically progressive environment of things or objects and of relations among things constituting laws or principles, and, lastly, of tentative judgments that serve as an experimental introduction or as a temporary scaffolding to the completed product. Relations, however, do not arise between static ready-made things which anticipate relations; the thing as intelligible in experience is rather in itself an equilibrium of relations. They are not mentality spinning itself out of itself, but they include in the conjunction in which they are spelled out, the logical apprehension of conscious intellect and the non-mental

activities which form the raw material of the universal environment. Things are the mutual arrest of forces which have assumed spatiality, a conjunctive balancing in the ceaseless activity of the me and the not-me. Hypothesis and law both refer to the real action of forces in relation, the former to the investigatory stage, the latter to the verification illustrated in actual conjunction. Things, laws, hypotheses, are equally real, equally objective; although the reality of the last, being of an adjunctive character, is by its nature temporary. So that there is not in things any backward limit of relations or judgments, but experience is constituted of judgments. Reality is not man-made; it is evolutionary in life, but its formulation is humanistic. Man's environment is the *real* and truth is in relation to *his* criterion of thought.

31. *The Thought-Situation Like a Wave.* The thought-situation may be compared to a wave that rises and falls because of the blowing of the wind. There is in the sea a motor cause that makes it rise above the surface current and then sink back within it again. The cause or solicitation of the thought-situation, however, is within itself. "The nature of thought-activity is correlative with thought-content from the standpoint of their generating conditions in the movement of experience." (John Dewey, *Studies in Logical Theory,* p. 70). It both incites itself and controls its own movement; if there is a division of cause and development, and resultant or effect, it is a purely theoretical differentiation of mutually dependent aspects or moments of realization. The cause of thought-movement is an end that must be harmonized with the rest of experience, which is always forward-looking. But

that end in the act of realizing itself is also the movement, and in the completed realization it is the effect or object of the thought-situation. (Cf. Ibid. pp. 61, 81). Every experience is thus a "deed-thought," conduct that is ideational or cognition that is volitional. The end as the motive at both termini has passed from an interest that was potential to one that is now actualized in a thought-complex of intellect and feeling and firmly framed in the rest of experience. There has been a process of unification. It is a true thought-situation, because unlike the instinctive biological situation which reacts passively to the ends of a vital over-experience, it has *selected* its end from a context of thought or ideas and actively extended that context. This context is not the environment of instinct, but the broad intellectual environment whose theoretical limit is the totality of experience. The end has been operative throughout; first it directed the attention and then it was selective of the apperceptional group; finally it was self-resolved as a problem of experience in equilibration with the general continuity of experience. The end has had the activistic significance of an aim that must be satisfied. The satisfaction was that of a conscious life-interest in direct personal experience; it was an intellectual satisfaction with an under-current of emotion. Progressing in experience, the intellectual sea of environment has a shore line which is constantly shifting with the waves of the thought-situation and giving place to other lines more inland.

32. *Every Situation Co-ordinated by Ends Plus Values.* The end has been described as the motive or energizing force of consciousness, of subjectivity-in-objectivity. It

exhibits itself likewise as the instrumentality of the thought-movement. In the latter phase, life is ever revealing its character of activity. The activity is reflective, deliberative,—a process of judgment. Now the end as instrumentality, as a process of self-evolution in reference to the reciprocity of its environment, is the self-evolution of truth in relation to experience. (Cf. Wm. James, *Pragmatism,* p. 202). It gives us the world of relation. But considered as the end *per se,* as a life-interest that has become conscious of itself, as the idealized effect that is the cause of the thought-movement, it is *value.* The value-element points to the self-anticipation, to the isolation of the ideal and the intro-energizing of intellectual forces. But it can take its place in the world of worth only if actualized in a co-ordination of relations. These in their turn, bring about the completed value. Thus the end is both value and relation, depending upon whether experience is regarded from the point of view of its ideal aims or its working-tools. Intelligence as the tool-making capacity that builds relations, must follow from intelligence as the isolation and differentiation of aims. In fine, the world of truths is founded upon and is energized by the world of values. Relation and worth are the two factors that co-ordinate every situation. They are the landmarks by which intelligence knows that is traveling along the path of the reciprocal, inward-outward environment.

33. *Instinct Knows Interests but not Values.* The reverse characterization of the merely instinctive situation follows as a corollary. The fact of isolation is conceptual. Therefore, when only instinct energizes, there is no value-element and consequently no world of relations.

The simple life-situation idealizes no end and so it reaches neither worth nor truth. Value is of an ideal structure and is conceivable only by the operation of intelligence.

CHAPTER IV

VALUATION AND ITS CONDITIONS

34. *What is Value?* Value has been shown as the end in thought, as the chief contributor to the dynamism of thinking. Now it may be asked: What is the end typically? or in other words: What is value? It is an ideal, created by cognition; it is motor, actualized by will; it is need or desire, energized by feeling. It is thus a complex of idealized desire. "The value of a thing is in its desirability." (Chas. G. Shaw, *The Value and Dignity of Human Life,* p. 324). A worth is objective-subjective, a reciprocity, a mutuality of reference in experience. In its essence it is an inner self-retroactive realization. While it belongs indefeasibly to the thought-situation as a whole, it emphasizes the *reaction* to experience rather than the action of experience. Since it belongs to the context of experience, it cannot escape the sphere of relations, and so certain objects of the all-inclusive relational world may be grouped as having values in and for themselves. But these do not anticipate experience or desirability with an irreducible value element, any more than things anticipate relations. The world of worth arises with thought or experience.

35. *How Value Differs from Sentient Interests.* How does idealized desire differ from the sentiency of pleasure and pain? It is related to sentiency, but the intellectual capacity of idealization is constructive of an infinitely unlimited environment, both individual and social. There-

fore, sentiency must make room for feeling that is infinitely variable; it must give way to creative emotion. Satisfaction in view of ideal desires may be a reversal of the verdict of the biological "yes" or "no," and pleasure may be idealized into happiness and joy. Pleasure and pain act with an invariable, jerky, mechanical, response, and are capable at best of building up a *presentative* world, an environment of immediate and simple interests. With intellectuality, a tremendously unique, incomparable, environment, has made its appearance. Here is *re-presentation* that refuses to be bound. To limit that environment is so self-contradictory, that the very thought of limitation becomes a relation of extension. The biological situation is strictly circumscribed by the limited vital demands of instinct. The humanistic world of worths is as infinite as its temporal and spatial forms and as the rational apprehension of the universe that may extend to the non-empirical or transcendental. In this re-presentation that refuses to acknowledge any limitation, there is indeed desire urging towards evident interest, but it is not the primitive urging of pleasure and pain. The interest is such that it can achieve satisfaction only in the realization of an end or dynamic value that is properly and ideally fixed in the larger conceptual environment. The valuation process is the adjustive adaptation of the infinitely extended environment of self-consciousness. It is a reciprocal product of man and his world. "It is a relation between subject and object rather than a characteristic function of the object itself." (Chas. G. Shaw, *The Value and Dignity of Human Life,* p. 324). In a word, the idealized desire is as different from pleasure and pain

as the ideal ends that constitute the warp and the woof of the humanistic self-made or poetical world, exceed the simple, primitive, demands of instinctive life.

36. *History Advances by Ideal Ends.* The hedonistic school in ethics in attempting to erect pleasure as the universal standard has failed to appreciate the impassible gulf between biology and history—between life as such and life that has attained to culture. Both Spencer, the biological utilitarian, and J. S. Mill, the economic utilitarian, have overlooked the evolution of the environment itself, from perceptual to conceptual. In transferring the standards of the former to the latter, the utilitarian is forced against his will to give them an ideal transformation. Pleasure becomes "utility" or "greatest good" or "the general good,"—all of which are aims ideal and remote. Even the introduction of a qualitative distinction among pleasures, means idealization and remoteness. The ideal environment is thus acknowledged perforce, but the utilitarian fails to realize the unique import of man in his new environment. He still hedges him in with the primal sensuous limitation, refusing to allow him any freedom except such as he might have by analogy with the perceptual experience of the original life-situation. Intellect is, then, only a refinement of instinct, powerless to improvise. The dynamism of sentiency would constrain development along the lines of ready-made values, allowing intelligence only its instrumental character, but destroying any ambitions towards self-expression in the choice of ends. Such a world would condemn as merely ornamental, if not as useless baggage, most of those sentiments that we consider inseparable from our real selves. Intelligence might well

bemoan such iron-bound helplessness, and realizing the abjectness of its innate servitude, might decide to renounce itself. Such is, indeed, the upshot of an intellect that is self-deceived in the service of an irrational will-to-live, in the pessimistic system of Schopenhauer. But the change from biology to history whose import the utilitarian has failed to grasp, consists exactly in free self-creations, in unforseeable improvisations of intelligence. It is the purely biological state that "repeats itself," not the historical. Biology needs only to utilize its faculty of instinct which meets every situation with instruments already organized. History requires "the faculty of making and using unorganized instruments," (Bergson, *Creative Evolution,* tr. Mitchell, p. 140), which is intelligence. For there has been a change from the dynamism of sentiency to that of idealized desire or value, which is big enough to occupy and organize the ideal environment. History does not repeat itself, but is the free development of experience. It is thought-content, where value is logically constructive. Sentiency, then, is biology, but history requires valuation.

37. *The Contradiction of non-Intrinsic Values.* But it may very properly be objected that valuation as an isolating activity aiming at harmonization in a progressive contexture of thought-situations is a mere intellectual see-saw. The isolation of an end may mean nothing else than a pretext of instinctive life determined on an equilibration that now requires intelligence in order to "organize a machine." Value, then, may be nothing more than another kind of relation, and its localization and functioning at the termini of the thought-situation, nothing more than accidental. The resolution of the thought-situation would

completely dissipate value as value, and the residuum would be a relation purely and strictly formal, capable of instrumental functioning, but in no sense deliberately and qualitatively discriminated as an ideal aim. The dynamic ideal interests fixed in the orbit of a restless constellation that is unceasingly enlarging its path of revolution, apparently prove to be an illusion. Then with self-consciousness, as with the entire panorama of life, there is only co-adjutive adaptation to the forces of the environment that life may continue. Only instead of instinctive activity incited blindly in its individual manifestations and tending towards a kind of over-experience, here the complexity of problems forces to intelligence. (It might indeed be pointed out that this very complexity is already conditioned by an intelligence that is reciprocally creative of its environment, but the formal biological logician does not see any abrupt leap or change in the evolution of the environment). Organized machines must be manufactured, tools must be improvised and intelligence obligingly steps in to do the work. But it modestly follows the "vital impetus," contenting itself with the humble rôle of instrument, uncomplainingly drudging to solve problems that are handed down to it, ready-made. (Cf. Bergson, *Creative Evolution,* tr. Mitchell, pp. 52, 87, 145). Although there is reciprocity, and the environment is an externality-internality being full of machines originally unorganized that the intelligence has assembled and organized, and thus being dependent upon the intellect for its progress, nevertheless the adaptation as in the purely biological situation is essentially a passive one. For intellect, as such, has stepped in only where the original vital activity has been

blocked. "Representation is stopped up by action." (Bergson, *Creative Evolution,* tr. Mitchell, p. 144). It is so to say, "plugged activity." So long as its object or aim is given to it by something else, self-consciousness reflects something else. Its isolation of value is self-deceiving, for it has had no autonomous choice in the preference. It steps back into the place of an observer of experience or at most, into that of a laboratory assistant of experience. There may be creation, but there is no self-creation. The reciprocal environment, despite its indefinite ideal extension, is still the instinctively limited, determined, inward-outward. There is no difference, except as to exactness of process on the one hand, and clarity and control of procedure on the other, between instinct and intelligence. The former may be said to act with objective intelligence; the latter is unable to impose any original demands of its own. Its values are not really subjective-objective, but as far as its preferences are concerned, all are equally and uniformly objective. The objection is thus fully sustained that we do not explain the self-reflection and self-creativeness of man's world as building up a perfect and absolutely evolving environment; that we do not account for the ideally enmeshing thought-situation, by a system of values that turn out to be only momentarily specialized relations.

38. *Self-Conscious Evolution Demands Self-Selected Values.* In the attainment of intellect, the evolutionary reciprocity of life and environment has finally turned upon itself, and become intro-active. (Cf. Herman H. Horne, *Idealism in Education,* p. 3). Its operations indicate that life has now, in some measure, become the active arbiter

of its environment, by means of conscious, free, idealizing, activity. Life, at last, has developed the over-balancing differential of activity over passivity that completes its evolutionary independence. It has liberated itself, thereby finding itself in its fully developing environment. Life's movements now require intellect that is not only clarifying and controlling and guiding, but initiating and creating as well. Fully developed life is not sundered, like a helpless slave, from its own self-initiated ends. So that the life that has reached intellect by no means has attained its rightful stature in a valuation-process that is confined to the psychological or the formally logical. An intellect of the latter kind would really be futile, working on the dead level of a monotonous horizontal value-plane. It should not properly be called philosophic, for philosophy interests itself in goals and totalities and qualitative interpretations of experience. But if it were philosophic, it might soon discover the necessity of renunciation in the darkness of a world of fate.

39. *Intelligence Must Set its Problems as Well as Solve Them.* It is evident that valuation must receive a qualitative aspect before man really can come into his world. No evenly-balanced, objectively progressive value-serial will account for the evolution of his ideal environment. The life-interest as it manifests itself in intellection, is more than ideally representative; it is ideally constructive. It is framed in its environment, which is its ever-changing, developing experience, for, indeed, life never goes out of its respective environment to discover the ends of its activity. The fundamental and radical distinction between the course of instinctive environment

and that of intelligent environment is just this: the former has a single set of problems; and the latter, a double or complete set of problems. The single set consists of problems of instrumentality, of means to realize given ends. The complete set consists of problems of ends as well as of means. Intelligence not only solves problems, but it solves its *own*. It *places* them. For the ideal environment to develop in its complete evolution, as unlimited as thinking itself, it is necessary that self-consciousness should possess a degree of freedom or autonomy. There would be no conscious reciprocity if ideal preferences were impossible, if intellect did not function with some will of its own. Value as dynamic must be "a relation between subject and object rather than a characteristic function of the object itself." (Chas. G. Shaw, *The Value and Dignity of Human Life,* p. 324). The coefficient of qualification must develop in a conscious, creative, experience. Value is idealized desire, throbbing with the force of self. Finally, it is in the varied activity made possible by ideal values indefinitely diversified, that the evolutionary process attains its aim of a completely developed and completely corresponding intensive and extensive development.

40. *The Adjustment of Intelligence to its Reciprocal Environment.* Thus the continuum of a truly *humanistic* experience could not possibly come about on the basis of purely formal values, which, indeed, are mere relations. Life is purposive activity focusing on the adjustment and re-adjustment of the reciprocal environment. The intellectual adjustment is an adaptation with reference to ends that are ideal. But the logical values are *differentiated*

among themselves according to a qualitative gradation; qualitative distinctions are simultaneously introduced into the circle of relations in order to function in the developing inward-outward world. For man constructs his reciprocal environment in order that he may live in it. He forms an environment of ideal aims and he lives at all times in the company of his ideals. The equilibration of ends in the thought-situation is something more than logical see-saw. It is not alone the intellect serving and enlightening itself in an act of clarification; it is also ideal satisfaction, *the intellect serving the will that has selected the end.* The interest in the end is more important and more permanent than a simple logical resolution of judgments. The simplest value is not only an "ideal," but it is a "desire" having its roots deep in the experiental complex of deed-thoughts. The merely formal value would not function because it could not attract attention to itself and create a situation except by an act of will also, which then gives it a subjective-objective significance.

41. *Ideals Become Permanent Qualitative Values.* Values therefore possess a graded internal significance for self-conscious life; they are at once ideally isolable, they possess an ideal meaning-in-itself as the permanent residuum of previous experience. The judgment of value having once been made, a subjective attitude is immediately fixed in consciousness. This attitude is equivalent to a *qualitative* apprehension. While it is not implied that the original judgment is permanent or absolute, the attitude that has been established functions in a fixed way. It does mean a characteristic subjective-objective relationship in experience. It has furnished a mould in which

future thought activity is cast. An association has been established that has its roots deep down in the self-adaptive movements of life, now going on in the form of self-consciousness. The association is not in itself directly productive of formal reconstruction of experience—that is the work of intelligence handling and rearranging its relational groups. But while life has been clothed with intellect and moves with insight among its relations, the subjective-objective attitude theoretically tied to a relation, becomes a definite value existing independently in a qualitative grouping. A value, variable qualitatively according to quantitative extension of experience, but never abnegating its independent constancy, has been evolved as a tentative end. This end is the motive-power of the thought-situation functioning both as generating antecedent and selfward-director. Evolution now having turned upon itself, and consciousness being both the actor and the mould of activity in the subjective-objective reciprocal construction of its environment, the end functions as a self-urged impulse. Viewed as motive-power, it develops as a multiple of intelligence in the acts of will, in other words, as a motive. Thus value from the point of view of the *intension* of experience is a motive really expressing *intention* or autonomy. From the point of view of extension, it is a dynamism energizing the movement of the thought-situation. Experience, must also formulate itself as at least two-dimensional, vertical-horizontal, qualitative-quantitative, value-relational.

42. *The Thought-Situation is the Interplay of Value and Relation.* The thought-situation is then the interplay of value and relation and this also is the continuous

resolution of the thought-situation in the harmonizations producing experience. The will acts with the intellect in organizing the thought-situation and articulating the ends of life in a significantly deepening ideal environment. Value has been the stone that has cast itself into the water; and relations, the resulting concentric ripples. But the stone being self-active, instead of sinking has swished the water into a vortex. The vortex retains its self-impulsion and its form, but its content is ever changing. So life *in intellectu* acts freely and intelligently according to its attitude of subjective preferences or motives. Its method is activity by processes of idealization, and so it utilizes and metamorphoses its tentative ends in a duplication and reduplication of experience. While the tentative means will always be tentative, that is, experimental and secondary, expanding or contracting the tentative end, the latter always retains its independent integrity as an experience-vortex. The value-making process of isolation having by an act of will corresponding to intelligent enlightenment established an action-mould, functions thereafter in the thought-situation as valuation of values and reconstructive, unifying organization of relations. The former is the generating, the departure, the movement; the latter is the intellectualizing of the will. So that the thought-situation is not only a judgment of quantitative structural relations, a procedure of formal logic, but also at the same time a judgment of the qualitative value of the effected equilibration. Qualitative value has saved it from being a logical see-saw. Successive thought-situations are serially grouped in the evolution of the ideal reciprocal environment by functioning as clarifications of value; the

relations as they are formed are progressively articulated by their value-coefficient. Experience is all the time re-weaving the context of its ideal attitudes. Its moment of isolation has relation as its object, but the relation is again absorbed or annulled by an act of will that ideally desires isolation. The re-isolation of isolations is productive of progressive re-conjunction of relations. Experience is a continuum of comparisons or valuations of value simultaneously with inter-relation of relations. It is the infinitely changing points of intersection of the circle of values and circle of relations, the infinite points of whose revolving circumferences never coalesce but once, each of these circles being ceaselessly modifiable and re-creative at every contact. The isolation and the re-combination are the respective moments that indicate the changeability and becoming of experience, while idealized desire, capable of functioning completely as both end and means, assures the progressive evolution of self amidst a developing self-created environment. The will and the intellect have acted reciprocally, and value and relation are interlocked. There is no backward beginning to this mutual activity; both judgments of value and judgments of relation, and their factorable though unsunderable combination, are the very structure of experience and coeval with it. Experience is not an unforseeable adventure in a dark wilderness, but it is the self travelling in its own country, carrying its own tent-stakes and setting up its own abodes.

43. *Value Contrasted with Relation.* Experience thus has been discovered as a reciprocity,—on the one hand intelligent will or volitional intellect, and on the other, an environment ideally evolving. The ego is in the thick of

experience, its status and evolution are inseparable from experience. The self-revealed method of experience is a dichotomy, the analysis of a given multiple whose reciprocal factors are value and relation. It is the mind that is acting with these as aids in its dual form of judgment. If they are to be contrasted, the value-judgment may be said to set the pace, while the relation-judgment follows. The former is comparatively independent; it proposes the end. The latter is dependent, and works out the means. The former is the summary of a manifold of previous experience and is therefore a complex of all the faculties, the self pulling its environment and thereby pulling or rather pushing itself. The latter is instrumental only, and is therefore essentially an intellectual judgment or evaluation. Worth is the exercising of force or energy, the active conditioning of crises in life's evolutionary activity. It differs from the causation of instinctive interests in the variety of its ends, in their ideal status and in their ideal actualization or equilibration. It is a real value, self-selected with reference to the reciprocal environment, and not a vitalistic interest of the species shaping end and means. The harmonization is the business of the individual self. If the biological situation involves creation because its expressions and organizations are unforseeable, then the thought-situation implicates self-creation. While it is true that its momentarily changing world knows principle and law, and so is not unforseeable, its fulcrum of value is freely willed and wielded by self. It presents real self-activity in the ideal evolution of the environment, the continuance of the evolutionary process of the universe in ideal re-actions and re-con-

structions.

44. *Value and the Self-Creation of Freedom.* This development beyond the presentative existent is entirely the free prerogative of the ego. Freedom is self-creation, the conscious and influential interference of the me, in the experiential synthesis of the me and the not-me, the identification of the self by the self in the combination with its opposite. As applied in valuation, it possesses a growing and progressive status. It means an intensification of life, a more and more intelligent refinement of will, an ever-larger participation in the universe, an expanding knowledge of self. It is the ever-clearer theoretical differentiation between the me and the not-me, simultaneously with the ever-clearer practical or active identification of the me and the not-me. It is not freedom from the laws of nature, which would mean irresponsibility or life in fairy-land. These very laws express permanent elements of the ego's participation in nature. They are its own harmonization formulable in logical relations. They are part of the adaptation that forms the growing reciprocal environment. To be free from them is to be free from self—an absurd desire. The essential in real freedom is creativeness of experience, that it may be a decisive factor in progressive harmonization of mental situations. But the harmonization to function socially and objectively, to become apperceptive material as part of a common fund, will have to exist abstracted from any one's particular experience, in some independent and permanent relational form. Our experience is free, but not all our experiences or experiential elements. The laws of necessity are well authenticated, instrumental hypotheses to be

utilized by freedom in its onward creative evolutionary task of infusing intension into extension.

45. *Value Compared with Relation.* The two intersecting, mutually co-operative judgment groups may be compared as well as contrasted. Both kinds of judgments refer to, and deal with, the content of experience rather than its form. Although the value-judgment has been spoken of as a mould, it is not an empty or passive mould, but rather the moulded thought-conduct itself, the life-norm that advances experience. Although furthermore, the relation-judgment is instrumental, it is content that it re-arranges. It deepens or it diverts the thought-mould and re-constructs the norm. Moreover, from the fact that both deal with content, a further and ultimate characteristic will similarly describe the nature and the movement of both. This will genetically and definitively co-ordinate the values of the value-series, as well as organize definite inter-relations. It will explain just how the developing value-world proceeds while involving itself in a developing relation-world.

CHAPTER V

VALUATION AND SELF-AFFIRMATION

46. *The Recurring Problem of Value-content.* The characteristic by whose aid we shall endeavor to trace the changing value-relation content of life, is the undulating or wave-like movement of the thought-situations. Judgments of whatever kind, (whether revaluation of value, re-relation of relation, or the common interlacing of both) aim for a synthesis of re-related judgments. The component judgment itself is a comparison of concepts by affirmation or denial. Since the concepts are originally residua of judgments, this component judgment is a real synthesis; it is, however, an analysis also, referring or denying a predicate to a subject. The component judgments enter into wider groups forming syllogisms. The grouping is a synthesis as was expressed above, but it is no less an analysis, for a subject finds itself limited by a predicate. So that every synthesis is really an analysis, and every analysis is really a synthesis. (Cf. Chas. C. Everett, *Fichte's Science of Knowledge,* p. 103). The synthesis expressed in a simple mathematical equation, for example, is really an analysis, for the identification implies that ideally, at least, the two members are capable of being considered apart. If, however, it is not a case of identification but an analysis resulting in a judgment of greater and less, then the very analysis implies a synthesis of the two members to make the differentiation possible. In general, the analysis expressed in the proposition calls

for the synthesis re-constructed in the syllogism, but the major premise which is now the chief synthesis finds itself in its capacity of analysis in absolute need of another syllogistic synthesis. Here is the movement, the undulating aspect of the mutually involved thought-content. The analysis is no sooner complete than it rises high into a synthesis, but the next instant the synthesis sinks into an analysis only to rise again into another synthesis. The analysis is the trough of the wave, and the synthesis its crest; the incessant heaving forces trough to swell into crest, and crest to drop into trough, in a progressive undulation. The cause of the waves is ocean and wind; the water furnishes the indispensable material or medium, while the wind lashes it into movement. The undulations of analysis-synthesis are the activity of thought lashing its own content. The content is now analysis and now synthesis, as water passes forward from wave to wave. We see the sea of thought amidst the heaving of its billows, its collisions, its vortices. How did this content which thought has spread into ten thousand waves, originally come to be there? Is there not an analysis-synthesis in which they were all originally implicated? Otherwise, how can they get started and what would they be? The rationalist or intuitionist may look far beyond and seem to discern innate concepts or intuitional morality. The empiricist may confine himself to an enjoyment of the actual scene. But the difficulty of an adequate account of the thought-content and its values still remains.

47. *No First Value in Experience.* Experience is self-creative since its judgments are novel. But it is not self-generative of the totality of its elements and its creation

is rather re-construction. The very first relation implies relation, so that there is no first relation. Value already implies value. If it is not possible to see how experience first started, if such a demand is really tantamount to the self-contradiction of lifting experience above experience to contrast it with an external material, while all the time we are really landed *in* experience, is it not possible to see how experience really accounts for its own analytic-synthetic demands?

48. *Analysis-Synthesis Reaches Out to Problems of Reality.* The logic of experience thus introduces the epistemological problem, and, in a further sense, the problem of reality. How does the contexture of value and relation judgments, which is a process of idealization, obtain its content and its development? The analytic-synthetic process is not mere subjectivity, but consciousness itself in the reciprocity of environment. There is a single evolution, the evolution of the environment coincidentally with the evolution of the self. The intelligence, moreover, bears close reference to the very nature of reality itself. But we have limited our discussion and the ontological problem is not within the sphere of our present investigation. (Cf. § 8).

49. *Intelligence is an Actual Datum.* We have endeavored to show that reciprocity belongs to every stage of evolution. Every environment, on the one hand, is a reciprocity, a precipitate; every organism, on the other hand, is a resultant of life and environment. We cannot then look for the absolute evolution of the world, except as a precipitate where ideals impose the characteristic. It is our world, our experience, and we cannot separate intel-

ligence from the world, even theoretically. If our reconstructions of the evolutionary environment as reciprocal with life are symbolically true only, in the case of the lower forms, so that it may be claimed that we do not understand the real inwardness of life, our self-reconstructed environment is absolutely true because it is truth itself. It is not proper to trace the evolution of intelligence out of that which is not intelligence, for evolution invariably dichotomizes into intelligence as one of its factors. We cannot look for the evolution of evolution. We cannot look for any pre-experiential data, but must examine the analysis-synthesis complex in its situation of actual experience, and there seek its content.

50. *The Metaphysical Difference Between the Biological and Thought-Situations.* It will be instructive to draw a metaphysical differentiation between the biological situation and the thought-situation, between the work of instinct and that of intellect. The former situation receives its content from without, its adjustive machines are already organized for it; the urge of instinct is formative rather than creative. Its experience-precipitate makes evident its universal, instinctive, will-to-live. Its individual manifestations are finite and exhaustible. Its life-material, being given from without, it is conditioned from without and functions dependently only. As an experience, a "something or other," it depends on an experience outside it and over it. If a certain totality of vital relationships fails to be reached, the organism or species succumbs. It can never quite supply this totality from itself, because it cannot turn inward for the material and conditions of its dependence. The evolution of the environ-

ment in the advancing phases of the biological situation, is accomplished when life withdraws as it were, from one unsuccessful manifestation, to take advantage of another where instinct is more adaptively organized.

51. *Intelligence is Independent.* Continuing from this point of view, we discover that intelligence is the will-to-live that has attained an absolutely permanent manifestation. It is not fair to consider the intellect as the servant of the will, because it organizes that will. It conditions its ends and organizes its means with the machinery of will as reciprocal to its aims. Life now has attained *one* absolute experience which finds *all* its parts in its own progressive procedure. Evolution has reached its final characteristic environment with the thought-situation as its unit. Judgment, as deliberative adaptation instead of instinctive, now adjusts itself to itself. Experience is an uninterrupted continuum, and life's reciprocity with the environment is perfect, for it finds within itself the perfect control of all the material and content that it uses. As a "something or other" it is a dependent, but its dependence proves to be upon itself. Intelligence has discovered itself as perfectly independent, both as to activity and as to idealized content. Analysis-synthesis is the spontaneous activity of an infinite consciousness that extends itself every time it would seek to limit itself. (Cf. Wm. T. Harris, *Hegel's Logic,* p. 204). However we seek to bound experience by something else, we still find ourselves in the analytic-synthetic process of experience. Knowledge is thus the success of evolution. In instinct, life has been groping, but, in intelligence, it has recognized and known itself and its infinite destiny. The log-

ical problem thus dissolves into the epistemological and ontological.

52. *The Ego the Source and Aim of Analysis-Synthesis.* In man, something has at last been awakened that seems to make possible every potential development. The dichotomy of life is no longer a factoring into movements of action and reaction, but into an all-inclusive self and not-self, into a conditioner of experience amidst its conditions. The ego in Fichtean manner, posits itself as the condition of experience. But in positing itself, it already has posited an opposite in positive, constructive, form. However, instead of *opposing* itself to the non-ego, the ego *identifies* itself with the non-ego, so that the division is not really limitation as Fichte teaches, but the reciprocal movement of completion and fulfillment. Every analysis-synthesis is a discovery of the me in the not-me. The world is *my* ideal. The Cartesian *Cogito, ergo sum* may be interpreted to mean that I discover my identity and my willing when I think. But when I think, I have a purpose, I aim at an object, my thinking is life-impulse or desire, and therefore I have really discovered myself as life become subjective with reference to an environment that has become objective. The subjective is meaningless without the objective which it conditions, and conversely the objective conditions the activity of the subjective. The self, then, discovers itself in its environment as subjective-objective, in other words, as experience and evolution. It is the supreme co-ordination of evolution. Every analysis-synthesis finds in *it,* its final point of origin, and to it we must look for the organized content. It does not, by any means, will the world as its fiat, condemning it to

a lawless relativism, but it imposes itself in a creatively intelligible manner upon the flux of elements and forces. (Cf. Chas. G. Shaw, *The Ego and its Place in the World,* p. 399).

53. *The Temporal Element of Self-Positing.* The self thus has been posited as operative in an environment, not all the elements of which have been contributed by itself. The environment is ceaselessly implicated in the evolution of the self. Life moves in the self ideally with deliberate reference to previous movement, yielding an ideal "complication" or true history. Experience is history. The self thus has posited itself in the form of succession or time; its entire self-apprehension in its natural surroundings, involves a self-positing in time. The positing has been *in actu,* in movement and change. The world of things and events is constructed of ideal points whose necessary fixation in order to form these aggregations, is the work of the temporal. Time creates an artificial *now,* and makes it also a *here,* by creating a beginning for a series of points and thus organizing the work of judgment. This may be illustrated by the ordinary psychology of perception. As the primal condition of the self, the temporal partakes of the nature of the self, and has the form of infinity. For the self as a dependent, depends only on itself and never can escape outside its thought; likewise time can be limited only by time, so that to limit it is to extend it. (Cf. Wm. T. Harris, *Hegel's Logic,* p. 204). Evolution that has attained the phase of ideal environment continues to evolve infinitely in infinite time. Duration is the form of ideal environment or self-creation.

54. *Self the Ultimate Source of Qualitative Experience.* The temporal gives the intellect a new and specific definition, as that whose constructive activities of judgments are posited in time. The self is posited as the terminus *a quo* (in addition to a given specific antecedent) of judgments. As its characteristic work is idealization, that is, the setting of further ends to be solved by thought, it is also (in addition to the specific object) the terminus *ad quem*. The logical involution of analysis-synthesis, the interdependence that seems to create a vicious circle, finds in the temporalizing self its point of origin or rest. The self is thus a fundamental or supreme value according to which ends are posited, organized, and co-ordinated. Time is its instrumental form of judgment, working out the means. Every end or aim is an analysis-synthesis whose final synthetic aim can only be in the self. To it belong the most closely narrowed hypotheses of both value and relation. But both ends and means, values and relations, constitute the qualitative structure of experience. In a word, the self acting in time means the development of an interactive, value-relational world, and the paradox of analysis-synthesis seems to be solved.

55. *The Pre-Positing Understanding and the Positing Self.* Now that the ultimate ground and source of the undulatory movement of thought has been discovered in a temporalized self, the question still revolves on the apparent circular movement of the analysis-synthesis. Why is it that the judgment complex of experience, points back to the self, neither for its structural relations, nor as the fountain-head of value? Although it is the source, it does not *seem* to be the source. The answer is that in the every-

day business of life, the intellect consciously moves only among its adjustive judgments. It is theoretical or relational not for love of pure theory but only in so far as it is practically and immediately purposive. Ordinary experience deliberately confines its idealization to the analysis-synthesis complexes, keeping in the background of its consciousness the posited value-relation substrate of self. It is not interested in the substrate of experience, but only in the qualifications of experience. It is the state of understanding and is opposed to the self-conscious totality or total self-consciousness which the fully conscious intellect comprises. The complete intellect is the metaphysical reason or will as well as the logical-psychological understanding. This latter is the stage of reflection called by Hegel, the positing. The stage of the understanding is the pre-positing or pre-supposing. "Let one of these phases be unconscious, and the other a conscious one and we have the stage of insight known as the understanding, which presupposes being as a substrate and not as a self-relation or positing activity." (Wm. T. Harris, *Hegel's Logic,* p. 320). In fine, ordinary experience proceeds by analytic-synthetic recombination of complexes which are somehow already there.

56. *The Understanding and Reason as the Theoretical and Practical Selves.* We have seen that reflection recovers the positing of the self as an ultimate, a self-relation, a fundamental value, and as the immediate ground of the thought-undulation. The undulation itself which is the movement of understanding, is a process of mediateness, dependence, and the interposition of other factors. Understanding always discovers itself in its relations or

differentiations, which imply reference to something else. This pre-positing aspect of thought which regards differences only and seeks to fuse them into a higher retroactive synthesis, and finds its work ever productive of differences only, may be called the theoretical side of the intellect. It seems to confine its reach to formal syntheses, without a practical regard for values emanating from the self, that would release it from the circle of theory. But the understanding is an incomplete phase of thought. It must become positing or completely self-conscious, in order that the theoretical and the practical may proceed hand-in-hand, and that the practical may organize the theoretical differentiation and dependence on a positive basis of independence. The positing phase brings back the identity of experience, the pointing back of the elsewhere-pointing relations towards an inward source, and the permanence of the intelligent activity. It raises into the pre-positing consciousness those qualitative aspects of evolution that confer a directive value coefficient upon the relational phases of the thought-continuum. The understanding is not merely enhanced, but it is actualized and guided by the reason. The ideas of the reason that direct ideal ends are not simple conveniences, but may be traced in the very basic constitution of experience. Reason functions of itself as value-directive, and in the understanding as relational. In both phases, the self is revealed in reciprocal evolution with an ideal environment.

57. *Intelligence in Subject-Objectivity.* It is then from two points of view that the dichotomy of self and environment or the ego in the continuance of self-positing is seen to be necessary. On the one hand, from the ap-

proach of the self to the environment or the viewpoint of introspective reason, and on the other, from the approach of the environment to the self, or the viewpoint of evolutionary reason. (Cf. § 40). But are not the two viewpoints really different aspects of one? For is not experience auto-centric, the reciprocity of self-consciousness, so that taking either division of the dichotomy, we are led to expect the other? Analysis-synthesis finally discovers the constructive ego in the duality of subject-objectivity. The dichotomy, however, should always recall the essential unity of experience.

58. *The Biological Situation Knows no Free Positing.* We may now observe from the viewpoint of evolutionary reason how radical is the transformation from the purely biological situation to the thought-situation. The former knows no free positing, its dichotomy only reveals the life in the species, the formative and reacting, but not the controlling element. There is no morality necessary or possible, because the environment is not constituted of ideals; the will-to-live splinters into vital impulses. Interests never develop into values since every beginning is instinctive repetition; succession not being retained in judgments it cannot indicate a temporal relation. The interruption of succession which is inevitable except in a consciousness that has posited itself and idealizes its judgments, makes impossible the transition from eventhood into time. All the interests being given without qualitative preference, there is no need of morality or willing or time. The supreme interest is continuance, and all the others receive from this a quantitative character only. Right and wrong never can be anything else but individual

pleasure or pain, for these mean anabolism or catabolism. Life's aim is still fulfilled in the victory of the stronger and the augmenting of its range of environment to include the weaker, for the aim of continuance being quantitative knows no indefeasibility of individuals or species.

59. *Life's Realization in the Value-Positing Ego.* With the discovery or self-announcement of the ego in the thought-situation, life's quantitative aim of continuance halts and turns and becomes henceforth irrevocably qualitative. The environment is now ideal, in other words, a development in terms of self; there can be no more clash of environments except a qualitative struggle of ideas (with what this implies in a practical way), in other words, extension must be accompanied by intension. The ego realizes that it never can be displaced; it knows its indefeasibility. Its motives become touched by joy and sorrow as well as by pleasure and pain. It posits itself not alone as the motor element in an endless logical succession of judgments, but as a motive also, as a willing of experience for itself. It is its own original idealized desire, basing all other values upon itself as permanent actuating value. It is thus in the humanistic world that the practical becomes the qualitative and autonomous, and the will takes the aspect of a practical reason. The right and the wrong are referred back to the posited self in its idealizing capacity of reconstructing a reciprocal environment. They express motivation according to idealized ends; they describe qualitative values that have been bestowed by the independent positing of the self. They thus correspond to the free willing of free acts and connote a certain progressiveness or unprogressiveness in ex-

perience. It is thus by an act of the will that the relations of logical experience receive a moral qualification, for morality is nothing if not autonomous. Every thought-situation, then, involves its ideal attitude, which qualifies value and has a free moral character. In a word, the self-discovery of the will has disclosed the moral characteristic of the constructive worths of experience.

CHAPTER VI

FREEDOM, VALUE, AND HABIT

60. *The Moral Dilemma.* Now since the plain common sense of mankind is pre-positing, moving about in the circle of judgments with uncritical consciousness of self, can it really be maintained that morality is thus constructive of experience? For morality involves the free decision of the will according to a value that is directly conferred by the self. Freedom of choice means self-appreciative initiation of action, motivation by an end that is symbolic to the self. But does not plain common sense think its judgments and direct its environment by the social conscience or *Sittlichkeit?* "The citizen is governed only to a small extent by law and legality on the one hand, and by the dictates of the individual conscience on the other. It is the more extensive system of *Sittlichkeit* which plays the predominant rôle." . . . "By *Sittlichkeit* is meant the social habit of mind and action, underlying social customs, the instinctive sense of social obligation which is the foundation of society." (Morton Prince, *The Unconscious,* p. 308) (note). Is it true then that the moral character of experience is sublated by the fact that we thus act through habit, that we are content to remain unconscious of the logical roots of value in the self, that we proceed uncritically with the pre-suppositions of the understanding instead of always living in the complete and adequate movement of the

reason? Here we are face to face with the moral dilemma of Kant that forces ethics into rigorism. Kant would maintain that morality demands such perfect purity in the maxims of our conduct, that the idea of duty must always be present to determine the will. So that were inclination or social habit the springs of my action, my goodness would be only emotional or external. Its strict legality does not make it characteristically moral. According to this seeming paradox, *our* difficulty is: Is Morality then as commonly expressed in qualitative differences of value, really a fact in the structure of human experience? For we have emphasized the intensification, as well as the extension of the ideal environment, which calls for the *real* consciousness of freedom.

61. *Psychology Maintains Autonomy.* The needlessness of this moral dilemma may be proved by the facts of social psychology. Fichte defines *Sittlichkeit* as "those principles of conduct which regulate people in their relations to each other, and have become matter of habit and second nature at the stage of culture reached, and of which therefore, we are not explicitly conscious." (Morton Prince, *The Unconscious,* p. 308) (note). Habit is the economy of consciousness allowing it free scope for further idealized extension-intension of environment. If we are not "explicitly conscious" of the value elements in the habitual principles of conduct, we are at least implicitly conscious of them. For when an exception or an interruption occurs, habit at once awakens its proper ideal associations. The external conduct in question that has been hastily condemned as legal, is re-examined in the light of moral values. Consciousness is just as able and just as

ready to defend its habitual conduct viewed as ethical value, as it is to defend the actions that it is actually initiating. The qualitative aspect of value is continuous in both kinds of action, so long as the self continues its normal idealizing activity. *External* and *internal* applied to conduct can then be treated as mere psychological differences, and *legal* and *moral,* as differences of social and personal points of view. The organic combination of the moral with the legal, gives the personal evolution of freedom. The external authority has furnished merely a theatre of becoming to the moral self. "That which was external authority becomes freedom when one discovers its identity with his own inborn rationality." (Wm. T. Harris, *Hegel's Logic,* p. 18). The legal is the form of value, the moral adds the content by the free internalizing of the legal. This is the process of the development of the autonomous individual amidst the institutions of society. In a word, although common sense and ordinary activity, are pre-positing, they have in reserve the critical attitude of self-positing that is generative of value, and that reveals the free, evolutionary activity of the individual.

62. *The Contexture of Evolutionary Experience.* Taking stock of our deductions: Something has been assumed all along as the basis of a moral contexture of experience. This is the underlying hypothesis of the self-recognition of the self as the criterion of efficient values. Pre-positing experience is directed by beliefs which ordinarily do not rise into the full clarity of critical apprehension, but there is also present in consciousness the value-positing that creates ethical theory. By freely willing itself, the self comes into its prerogatives, escaping from

the thraldom of unreflective imitative conduct, where ideal concepts are no more than borrowed images because not self-constructed. Only then, truly, do values and motives assert themselves in the upbuilding of a truly reciprocal environment, not as mere stimuli characteristic of external objects, but as a monistic relationship between a subject and its objects. Ethics and natural laws both weave the contexture of experience; in the evolutionary process, value and relation are interlaced. Values are the motives and ends. They confer upon the analytic-synthetic process a logical plus an extra-logical character that together make possible the thought-situation in an actual intimacy of experience. They represent the presence of a rounded, unitary self where intellect is inextricably united to will. They belong also to the complex of emotions that springs up in this union. They bring joy of achievement, or sorrow of disappointment. It is by their means that life is saved from the endless monotony of just quantitative repetition and quantitative extension. They arise when life turns upon itself in intelligent realization of the aims of its course; to this course, they offer quality and dignity and subjective intensification. Values never become such by virtue of terminal positions in the thought-situation. If they did, they would be relations temporarily differentiated from their fellows, in order to serve as logical fulcrums. Conversely, rather, it is the relations that have to consult their requirements. Experience as a value-procession displays the moral and dynamic power of the self. Such is the activity that constructs a reciprocal ideal environment.

CHAPTER VII

SELF-POSITING IN A MORAL CRISIS, AND THE MOOD OF WANT

63. *A Deeper View of Intrinsic Value.* Our discussion must consider at this point whether it really has solved the contradiction of value-upon-occasion, of relation masquerading as value, and whether we have escaped from the dilemma of values that are qualitatively of the same kind as relations. Is not the self-positing that functions as the fountain-head and motive-force of experience an occurrence that just happens, a grand occurrence it is true, but still a mere logical and psychological occurrence? If so, are we not still in the formal dialectic of analysis-synthesis, without having filled the desideratum of real content in experience, and have we not thus reduced the moral quality of the value-creative self, to the zero point? May we not complain with Stirner, "Am I that which is within me?" It is true, moreover, that we have made the practical co-equal with the theoretical, but have we necessarily escaped the "eternal recurrence" of Nietsche? Is the practical, the moral *per se?* We may even find the ego in the thick of activity freely exercising its idealizing capacity, but dragged along by a universal activity, that to it, means determinism, so that its valuation, as subjective-objective activity and result, turns out to be a morality that is self-deceiving, a mere pretext for general activity, and futile to introduce real autonomous value

into the texture of evolution. Furthermore, ends that further preferred activity need not necessarily take the form of qualitative morality; their social permanence, even, may be usefulness or economy. Finally, what is to prevent the individual self that has been disclosed by the dichotomous analysis of experience, from supinely surrendering its will, rejecting its freedom, and contracting its sphere to purely biological interests? For if evolution is autonomously possible, then involution is also an alternative.

64. *Self-Positing in a Moral Crisis Gives Real Value.* Evidently the positing of the ego as the mere psychological and logical antecedent of the flux of pre-positing analysis-synthesis will not reveal to us the real qualitative criterion of value that is creatively evolving the ideal environment. There must be a positing of self that means self-affirmation, self-assertion, and self-willing by the individual as individual; no general self-positing *forced* upon the individual by the contexture of experience can create values. The *I* must will itself in itself and for itself. It must elevate itself into self-consciousness above its temporal genesis and above its intro-active and social environment. It must will itself deliberately and indefeasibly in a moral crisis that brings about the transition from its potential self to its actual self, and creates its individuality amidst its own reciprocal ideal environment. The self must will itself for the sake of its own ends in an objectively ideal world, creatively idealizing the latter's evolutionary aims, and establishing their qualitative significance by its free and active preference. It must realize its indefeasibility as supreme value and thus attain the full stature of intel-

lect. It will then know itself as infinitely modifiable by its self-conferred qualifications of reciprocal experience. It will feel its power as evolutionary activity, freely acting to create endless modifications, capable of every degree of appreciation, every point of intensification. It will thus be promotive of a real infinity of experience—one that is infinitely intensive as well as infinitely extensive, an evolution of two dimensions. In fine, it is in the moral freedom and moral causation of the individual, that we must look for the real and absolute evolution of experience, for the infinite qualitative increase of ideal environment.

65. *The Requirements of Such Self-Positing.* How then does the self posit itself and simultaneously undergo a moral crisis that comes from a perfect, autonomous, willing of self, thereby conferring real, transforming, extra-formal, qualitative values upon the thought-situations of experience, and truly introducing the moral factor into the continuum of the ideal evolutionary environment? How does the self declare its independence of the social imagination, whose images are *copies* of ideals and not the ideals themselves, and therefore to the individual deterministic and heteronomous? How, furthermore, does the self posit itself as creative and progressive rather than as destructive in the reciprocity of environment? How finally does the indefeasible self, absolutely autonomous, posit as a unique individual, a moral law that is formative of the scale of values in a society of individuals, so that there is one, and *only* one law that may have infinite applications according to the infinity of possible conditions? An investigation by the method of dichotomy more profoundly applied and the consequent implications of exper-

ience in its aspects of environment and intelligence, will give us a true account of the finally determining self-positing of the self.

66. *Want and Prophecy Work Towards Real Values.* The clew will be found in that ceaseless activity of the internality that forms the very self-expression of life. Already in the purely biological situation, the internal manifests itself as activity. There is no absolute rest in nature and literally *to be* is *to act.* Intelligence to a certain extent is funded by instinct and its processes and primarily manifests itself in a status of activity. But intelligence already has transformed instinctive activity into a time-series, it has manifested itself as consciously directive, as organizer of analyses-syntheses, as satisfied or dissatisfied with its self-constituted system of relations. With the awakening from the biological heritage that overlaps the social environment, the potential intelligence posits its reality; it no longer passively manifests itself as a reaction in environment, but it positively and actively indicates its presence in the free continuance of a reciprocal environment. For intellect has appeared and posited itself as reason with a characteristic mood, the mood of insufficiency and want. Thought is an endless agitated heaving of waves, each one of which seeks to melt into its other or fulfillment, only to find that the mood of dissatisfaction has been intensified by its other, and so it is doomed to disappointment. Intelligence cannot rest from the creation of these self-manufactured ideals, because it knows that while its dissatisfaction is of its own making, its satisfaction also can come only from itself. Intelligence thus posits itself in an evolutionary time-series with

the unique burden or problem of actual wants and potential satisfaction. The reaction to a mood of want that is increasingly disappointed must be a progressive intensification of ideals. (Cf. Chas. G Shaw, *The Ego and its Place in the World,* pp. 17, 508). Out of man's suffering and sorrow has come much of his enlarging world. The self has not coolly and calmly posited itself amidst evolutionary development, acting impersonally and reconstructing, according to its talents, in ways that matter not. On the contrary, the self posits itself in a world that is peculiarly its own, from which it cannot and will not escape, a truly human world of ideal wants and ideal satisfactions. In other words, the purely logical, psychological, self-overarching of analysis-synthesis is still mere biological instrumentality and does not disclose the unique nature and activity of the independently idealizing, value-seeking self. But with its mood of want, the self both seeks and obtains, as well as imposes, the *extra-logical* immediacy and intimacy of content that possesses a standardizing isolable value, and that analysis-synthesis only schematizes, after it is thus created. Its dissatisfaction with the content at hand, makes the self posit itself as infinitely prophetic. Every ideal is a prophecy of satisfaction and joy, arising out of the inadequacy of the present ideal. It is thus that values proceeding out of intelligent self-assertion, have become idealized desires. They reflect a deepening moral intent because prophetically correlated with a supreme ideal of selfhood or Reason that has eventuated in the want-composite of feeling-intellect-will. Thus in the dichotomy that reveals intelligence, there is a display of unique characteristic capacity, that proves the completed

evolutionary advance of experience. The environment is now perfect because it is infinitely perfecting itself.

67. *Plastic Material for Revaluation is the Fulfillment of the Biological Situation.* There is no prophecy in the actors of the purely biological situation, for here satisfaction is a unit, a fixed quantity, and never becomes dissatisfaction. There is no progressive unifying of situations by an ideal synthetic bond; each is practically a closed system. While the situation may develop a complexity of action and reaction in certain species and appear objectively intelligent, even operating with the psychical apparatus of perceptual images and anticipation, yet there is no continuum of experience. The specific response may be a complication, factoring instinct into already organized instrumentalities of organic memory. But there is no uninterrupted and remorseless succession of idealizations, and, consequently, no consciousness of time. Life seems simply to be manifesting itself and maintaining itself, and functioning in a temporary environment that is to dissolve in the perfected environment of intelligence. The dissolution is not a disappearance, but a ballasting or stabilizing of the ideal environment in experience. Intelligence posits itself in time, prophetically constructing an ideal world amidst a content of experience, that apparently possesses no point of beginning, whose ideal successions urged by the restlessness of ideal wants are always outstripping themselves and always in a state of dissatisfaction. The beginninglessness is really the heritage of content, due to the biological, which now enters into a series of temporal idealizations. Intelligence with its wants becomes infinitely self-expansive; every re-combination is a

new ideal satisfaction-dissatisfaction, a new want that never has existed before. In fine, the immediate content of experience is both found and created by the hungering and thirsting intelligence.

68. *The Biological Situation Anticipates the Thought-Situation.* Thus the biological situation has realized its purpose as an anticipation of the thought-situation where life is revealed in its fullest potentialities and capabilities. It has functioned as life-maintenance and stability; it functions permanently in a mutual economy demanded by the over-experience of nature. The over-experience is now recognized as having accomplished its purpose in becoming part and parcel of humanistic experience. Its relative temporariness has been destroyed as well as realized when its inheritance became temporal material in idealizing intelligence. The infinite content of ideal wants is already stabilized in a system of interests that have signified no interruption to evolutionary development. The whole scheme of evolution is co-ordinated in the economy of nature, which indeed is chiefly economy as related to the ego, to man. Evolutionary experience does not end with an attitude of logical formality, but it brings with it ceaselessly oncoming values of the very nature of the self, that ever tend to still its hunger for content.

CHAPTER VIII

THE FULFILLMENT BY IDEALIZING WILL

69. *Intellect Must Be Supplemented.* Now the problem must be considered, how does the intellect transform the empirical whose last word seems to be dissatisfaction into a real value-series whose elements are purposive and moralistic, for it is evident that the satisfaction of wants is only relative to the satisfaction of underlying supreme want? Unity is the method and aim of analytic-synthetic idealizations. The ideal of this unity, the intellect never can attain, for every unified thought-situation immediately reveals a pluralistic character, requiring further unification. The logic of intellectual operation *per se* is restricted to the sorrow of unfulfilled want. The logical restlessness of experience seems to impose a fate on the self that dooms it to endless activity, but whose qualitative values are still not of the ego's willing. How does the self use its talents to escape from the limitations of itself to become really and truly free, joyously proposing its autonomous ends, and unmistakably infusing value into its own ideals and then into the texture of the reciprocal ideal experiential environment.

70. *Self as non-Temporalistic over against an Ideal of Totality.* Value has been shown to be the product of isolation. (Cf. § 42). The ego establishes the supreme value of experience and saves itself and its happiness, bringing peace to its mood of want by a final and supreme act of isolation. In this supreme moment, the self posits

itself as will. (Cf. Chas. G. Shaw, *The Ego and its Place in the World,* p. 341). The process is as follows: The intellect has discovered itself ceaselessly operative in a temporal world. The temporal succession brings a certain empirical enlightenment only, that is always prophetically pointing towards something else. The temporal flows remorselessly and unceasingly. I am not satisfied with my present environment, my experience of to-day. I am not that which I am, but that which I *can* be. The intellect thus negates its present status for a more positive assertiveness. But its positive assertiveness turns out to be another self-negation. The intellectual positing of the self is thus a negation of the self, amidst the negation of the reciprocal environment of experience. Then just as the temporary of the biological situation is negatived as to its own independence becoming a phase of the temporal of experience, so the temporal itself is negatived to become a phase, a phase in time, of the timeless totality. The ceaseless movement of analysis-synthesis is negatived by a unity that is vainly sought amidst the plurality, but that is self-willed in order to satisfy the ego's imperious mood of want. *There is a reciprocity of supreme, isolating, totalizing act, on the one hand, and totality itself, on the other hand,* and the sorrow is transformed by an inward joy. It is the will that has acted, wresting a supreme totalizing value for its own sake and for the sake of its experience. The intellect knows no way out and its monism is methodological rather than real. The supreme negation of the temporal by an act of will establishes the complete dependence of the logical upon the self and, reciprocally, the dependence of the ideal environment upon the non-tem-

poral totality. It is a moral attitude of free co-ordinative evaluation, that makes all the differences, the pluralities, the logical negations, refer back to self, these manifesting its essence and clothed by it with positive and uniting temporal values. Finally, it must be realized that the self has not willed the totality and imposed its values, by way of extension of experience only. This might still be renunciation and acquiescence and a freedom that is self-deceiving. It is the intensification or intension of experience that has chiefly been willed. Nothing could be more contradictory to such an outlook for experience than the introduction of an all-powerful, relentless, objective or impersonal will-of-things. The world of value, perforce must be founded upon an interpretation of evolution as intension-extension.

71. *The Constructive Fulfillment of the Mood of Want.* The supreme positing of self under the aspect of the totality is a response to a supreme want that longs truly to evaluate the continuum of life's activities, and so its insistent characteristic must be a positive, dynamic, willing of its humanistic experience or ideal environment. The self has de-temporalized its experience, opposing itself to its temporal, experiential series. This opposition as the supreme negation of the formal intellectual phase is also at the next ideal moment the self-positing of experience, this time with reference to the totality of universal evolution, and the worth-transformed return of the temporal. The self has discovered itself in an evolution where its purposes are really significant, and identical with the purposes of a totality. The sorrow of intellect in the disappointments of the ever-changing situations of exper-

ience, gives place to joy of will as their respective purposes stand self-revealed. The eternal restlessness is enlightened by the principle of totality, and happiness is infinitely extended through the intensive joy of self-achievement and free self-realization.

72. *Moments of Self-Positing Lead to Culture and Religion.* The three moments or aspects of the dichotomy of intelligent evolutionary experience, revealing the self constructively posited amidst its experience are, then, as follows: the intellectual positing which comes first, is enlightenment and purposive activity revealing the creativeness of the self in empirical movement. But the purpose is not yet self-purpose, and the creativeness not yet self-creativeness. The movement is, therefore, not really self-movement; intelligence sorrowfully and even rebelliously feels its instrumental character serving ends not of its own making. Secondly, the will posits the negation of the entire intellectual complex. But this, thirdly, is the positive self-positing in the name of a non-empirical totality. The enlightened and aroused will makes the *whole* of the reason self-active. It now is aware that the intellectual movement is only the pre-positing series belonging to the understanding, and that all experience in time is actually the positing of the self by the self. The indefeasible character of the reason consists in this totalizing, volitional capacity, that confers upon experience, in both an individual and social reference, a dynamic and objective value-series. Volitional totalizing dirempts the positing nature of the self, from its pre-positing functions. This diremption posits the self as non-empirical, intelligible, noumenal. It likewise posits a totality that is nou-

menal. The timeless, as summarized in the Platonic trinity of the Good, the True, and the Beautiful, are realizable or exemplifiable in time. The diremption of the self from the totality of its attitudes in experience, is culture, the "despatializing of the ego," (Chas. G. Shaw, *The Ego and its Place in the World,* pp. 97, 407), and we may add its detemporalizing also. It is likewise religion because it is a unifying practical attitude towards the totality of all that is possible. The ego must become cultural and religious; it must *will* its religion before it can attain a true scale of values making possible the construction of experience, the upbuilding of an ideal intensive-extensive environment. This experience is the qualitative, two-dimensional infinitude where the ends or the milestones are values. It is inconceivable without autonomous, indefeasible selfhood.

73. *The Happiness of Indefeasible Self-Realization.* Having accomplished its supreme act of isolation in the noumenal positing of self, thus discovering its final source of value, the intelligence now discovers fountains of joy in the ceaseless combinations and re-combinations of experience now apprehended as purposive. It has found its salvation and its happiness with itself, within the saving grace of its value-idealizations. It has been able to make an interest out of the farthest reach of the non-empirical, thereby attaining the criterion or law of perfect valuation; for there are no values more essentially real, than those imposed by the purposes of totality. It has received the joy of the creative task of formulating and applying this universal law. The purposive realization of self, in harmony with the infinitely potential realization

of the totality, is now its problem. An infinite qualitative ideal thus has been set as the goal of extensive-intensive evolution. If the valuation process of ideal evolutionary development brings sorrow in its train, it is no longer because intellect finds itself thwarted by aimless and hopeless extension, but rather because the intensive ideals of the will find themselves thwarted. But when the struggle is overcome, joy alternates with suffering and happiness is more complete. For true happiness is made up of joys, not of uniform joy.

CHAPTER IX

THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE AS CULTURE AND RELIGION

74. *The Character of the Law of Qualitative Values.* In the light of the voluntary positing of self in culture and religion, we may conclude that it is by the operation of valuation rather than by that of logical relations, that the self proves its uniqueness, its superiority, its indefeasibility, and its immeasurable elevation above instinct. It would not, then, be correct to say that the thought-situation is a development with commensurable steps out of the biological situation. The latter may be viewed as a forerunner, a funding of material content. It can be described from the viewpoint of thought, of experience, but the converse does not hold. We are now ready to frame the criterion or law that shall express the supreme value and that shall arrange a qualitative scale of values. We see that the same law will have to be willed by all moral beings, because each individual as a hankering, prophetic will realizes his indefeasible self-creative freedom in a noumenal world, that is, a world of purpose where purposes themselves are totalized by a grand purpose. Purposive evolution implies a single moral norm. But although the law is one, its applications, its value-conferring powers are as indefinite as the extension of experience, and as intensively variable as the self-regulated conditions of autonomy. Its exemplifications are as infinite as the growth of the ideal environment, and therefore in its

potential expressions, the law is as full of variety as there are manifolds of states in indefeasible selves. Lastly, it follows that as the law must express the grand purpose of the totality, it cannot be material and specific in its own content. Its genesis is noumenal and so it cannot be a formulation ontologically *from* experience, but rather *for* experience. It must be a form of universal legislation. The centralizing creativeness of the law really acts to bestow a noumenal conditioning upon experience. At heart, the evolution of the ideal environment is thus a noumenally directed continuation of the process of life. In fine, we have come upon the fundamental, non-empirical law of values in retracing the revelation of the rounded self in the reciprocity of its potentially infinite and glorious experience.

75. *Kant's Categorical Imperative from a Genetic Approach.* We are now ready from a genetic approach and an evolutionary standpoint for a re-statement of Kant's categorical imperative. From the aspect of the dichotomy that reveals the reciprocity of intelligence and environment, the categorical, imperative character of this law lies in the fact that it is the method attained by life that is now self-directive in evolution, intelligently self-expressive with the imposition of values in experience. It is the infinitely important furthering of purposes that stand intelligently self-revealed through cultural and religious introspection. As autonomy in action, it is not necessarily rigoristic. It does not destroy the natural inclinations of the self; on the contrary, it makes possible the pleasure of self-creative conquests.

76. *The Re-statement of the Categorical Imperative.*

The dichotomy of experience shows the ceaselessly active self in the midst of the reciprocally developing environment. The noumenal positing of the self, shows the intelligent will over against the totality of its environment. It also shows the totality as a supreme ideal and the ideal environment of experience as the consequent functioning of the supreme norm. The self-positing of the ego is the source of value, and the working out of its self-imposed law orientates all the values of life. The categorically imperative law takes two forms according to the ideally separated moments of the dichotomy, a form that relates to the self and a form that relates to the totality. Both forms are dynamic and can be separated only to be reunited in the reciprocity of environment. As purely introspective analysis, the categorical imperative expresses the indefeasibility of the autonomous individual:

> So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end, never as a means only.

As adding the prospective environment, the categorical imperative expresses the indefeasibility of universal conduct or activity, for only such will realize the purposes of the totality:

> Act so that the maxim of thy will can always, at the same time, hold good as a principle of universal legislation.

The two forms in unison show the self as realizing its

own purposes in self-orientation; in isolation from and combination with experience; in autonomous application of a scale of values. The completed categorical imperative is also a program for the absolute evolutionary potentiality of the self. For while the supreme value is thus made equivalent to a fixed fundamental immovable sense of values, and to an indefeasible platform of values, the specific formulations of universal legislation are subject to revision and amendment with the growth of intellectual enlightenment. The will wills to follow the intellect; the clash of ideals in the realms of theory and practice may still go on. But it insists that the intellect should regard the noumenal law that its own extremest idealization has established. The field of evolution is a "kingdom of ends"; these ends may be temporal and therefore changeable. But the kingdom itself is the grand end absolutely stable and unchanging.

77. *The Categorical Imperative Solves the Contradiction of Extrinsic Values.* With the recognition of the categorical imperative as the norm of quality and worth, we have solved definitely the dilemma or contradiction of the qualitative that may turn out to be a temporarily masquerading quantitative. Values are recognized in their true character. They are not such merely by virtue or their position in the logical structure, but they necessarily account for the structure itself constituting with relations actual phases in experience. *The intelligence has now undergone a moral crisis.* A supreme law of value, directly and immediately reflecting the intelligence, has been willed as a norm irrespective of empirical relations, and experience is now functional of the volitional positing

of self. The pluralities of existence that exhibit the analytic-synthetic process of thought, cannot now appear as the cause of irrepressive annoyance. They come because their value has been willed, and they are satisfying in their time and place. The unsatisfying, onward-reaching, prophetic nature of the intellect has turned out to be satisfying because all the prophecies now relate to a prophecy that has been fulfilled. The vicious circle of recurrent unities has been broken. The endless idealizations in time, are finally supported by the ideal of a detemporalized conditioning. The unities no longer act as disappearing points in the circle of experience, but each one functions simultaneously as subjective value and as analytic relational plurality. The totality has become a retroactive ideal, and so the non-empirical has essentially and prophetically become part of experience. Lastly, experience as a grand summation will ever remain an infinite and inspiring ideal.

78. *The Categorical Imperative Provides the Reciprocity of Culture and Religion.* Furthermore, as the values of experience are willed from the two dichotomous points of view of the self and the environment, they reveal the culture of the self and the religion of the self. (Cf. Chas. G. Shaw, *The Ego and its Place in the World,* pp. 510, 517 and passim). The first form of the categorical imperative emphasizing the de-temporalized aspect of self is the expression of the spirit of man, or the mood of culture. The other form emphasizing the totality and directive of destiny fulfills the soul's most imperious wants and is the mood of religion. In the completed form, culture and religion are reciprocal moods of the self, outlin-

ing the method of intelligence in its construction of the world. The self is conscious of its ability to manage experience, but it further realizes its co-operative dependence upon a common destiny.

79. *Perfect Autonomy Found in Culture and Religion.* True freedom is obtained in culture and religion. For without the grand and final isolation of personality amidst its kingdom of ends, it is impossible to escape from values as economic, that is, as masquerading quantitative relations. If supreme values are merely willed within the empirical circle, they are willed in a kind of moral desperation, a purpose being forced upon experience, a belief being created *post facto*. Values that simply clarify past action do not necessarily control it, or account for it. The initiative is still external to the self, which has not awakened to true freedom, or willed its experience. Passive values even where the self interprets them as such, do not rise from economic to moral, because there is no self-creation about them. But culture wills personality as supreme value, and as the subject of experience. It is this subject that finds a predicate for itself in the evolutionary process. It discovers in its intelligence the possibility of an infinite environment. In the discovery of this environment, the self passes on to religion.

80. *The Final Support of Value is the Religious Mood.* The self-willing of culture after all, has been the momentary negation of experience in space and time, but it has not been negation merely. The obverse phase is the negation of the negation in the affirmative, that is, the all-reflecting positing of the self in that infinite expansion of experience that is the true reciprocity of the self. The

affirmative self-positing that discovers the final destiny, is a self-revelation of universal purpose amidst a personal attitude of self-legislation. Value identifies itself with the morality of universal purpose. Morality bases itself upon voluntary conviction and belief, and becomes in its essence, an expression of the totalizing religious sentiment. Religion is found just in this attitude towards a final totality of all that is. The categorical imperative entering at last as the criterion of value, into all the values that create the humanistic world, is founded upon a religious assumption of freedom. Its autonomy is a deliberate declaration of independence from all heteronomy of space-and-time forms and conditions. Not one of these can by itself fulfill the inward moral want, although each may bear upon and influence its satisfaction. The kingdom of ends that is infinitely tending to satisfy the absolute want of the self, in the terms of religious inspiration and history and achievement, is the kingdom of Heaven.

CHAPTER X

THE MORAL CRISIS IN ITS SOCIAL GENESIS

81. *The Ego and Experience.* We have seen that evolution is the development of a unique cultural environment, the construction of a reciprocal world in accordance with a system of values founded on supreme value. It is a free, indefinitely continuable series of worths reflecting personality with its hopes and fears. The primevally blind impulse of life has become self-realized and self-enlightened in the ego. It is now understandingly and emotionally interested in its self-expression. Its action is not so much reaction as *real* action, or perhaps *selfward* reaction, capable of exercising a balance of power, manifesting real freedom in a social experience. Evolution is the drama of intelligence which in the totality has willed a religious climax. The dramatic presentation is that of culture. The unities of time and place direct the unfolding. As one of the primary aims of experience, the thought-situation has a cultural-religious character; as the secondary proximate aim of equilibration, or what is the same, as the instrumentality of experience, it is cultural-scientific.

82. *Culture and Religion Come from Social Experience.* However, the categorical imperative that makes possible an attitude towards experience as purposive and as total, and that opens the view of the evolutionary drama, although it must posit supreme isolation as express-

ing supreme value, nevertheless forbids any isolated, unsocial dramas. Its application immediately becomes content of universal legislation, and so is necessarily social. The noumenal positing of self is a truly religious act, placing the personality *en rapport* with a maximum of experience where purpose may be read. This hankering after destiny is essentially social thinking; it is the continuance of thought-interchange and thought-communion; it is the realization that a universal aim is possessed and must be attained, in common. The categorical imperative becomes a religious institution, and, like all such, is essentially social thinking and behavior. The relationship, furthermore, of the respective individualized dramas, is that of indefeasibly co-operative units. Not only is the self indefeasible, but its very outlook of infinite extension-intension of experience makes it recognize the indefeasibility of selves. Disinterested self-valuation free from the complications of economic situations, motivated by the holiness of personality, calls for the furtherance of the non-empirical aims by a plurality of personalities. While men have discovered that they possess the same destiny and the same law, and must follow the same universal legislation, they also have discovered that the idealizations possible in experience are infinitely varied. They may make their indefeasibility good by an individualized process of analysis whose aim is a social synthesis which again is thrown back into an individual analysis. The undulation may be compared to that of the purely logical process, except that there is here an interchange of individual and social, and that the mood is a deepening prolongation of the peace that has followed the moral crisis. (Cf. § 71).

There is all the room necessary for the holy and inspiring egoism of the super-personality. In a word, the isolation of values that builds the thought-situation, and that rises towards clarification in an equilibration process, is not a personal, individual harmonization alone, but just as well, a social harmonization. Not that others must be just as satisfied as myself,—they may indeed be very much dissatisfied with the harmonization that I have brought about. But my values, to have meaning, must have social axes of reference, must be applicable to the social destiny where I build autonomously according to my talents. The thought-situation is, then, an angle or a viewpoint in the living contexture of the larger social experience. *My* values are also *social* worths, and I can no more frame an abstract, egotistically isolated system of values, than I can frame for myself an isolated system of intellectual relationships. Either case would remove me from the general trend of the evolutionary development of experience.

83. *The History of Value Content.* How values pass back and forth in the larger experience, how they are accepted and actualized by the individual from their social situation where their moral characteristic is so far potential, is as much a matter of psychology as it is of ethics. The individual is born into the kingdom of ends, which men are laboring to attain, just as he is born into all its agencies in the shape of his intellectual equipment, for the carrying out of these ends. In other words, he finds himself already part of an evolutionary development motivated by values and adjusted by relations. He finds himself first in the easy process of mental equilibration by

means of imitative mental images rather than self-responsible ideals; in the condition of living by that all-embracing social imagination, which has indeed been recommended by some sociologists as the infallible guide to conduct. He naturally has made the incontrovertible discovery that a system of isolated values would be almost as absurd as a system of isolated relations. He acts through imitation, *Sittlichkeit,* legality, rather than through the application of the categorical imperative as the moral norm. While psychology describes the mental genesis of values, ethics will supplement the account by pointing to a moral crisis that makes for a personal interpretation and appreciation of values by a self-identification of personality and experience with supreme value, and the voluntary cultural and religious positing of the categorical imperative. It can, then, show that the stage of evolution by semi-automatic images instead of by ideals bearing a value coefficient is just preparatory, a matter of action-habituation and natural economy. The original attitude that values are not problems is discovered to have been a temporary assumption when autonomy asserts itself.

84. *The Rise of Value through Revaluation.* We have spoken already of the stabilizing function and the heritage of material that is given from the biological situation. (Cf. § 67). The background of the moral crisis which arises in experience and bestows a metaphysical transformation upon it, requires completion by means of the introduction of the social situation. The complexity of the factors of the thought-situation bears in its composition the instinctive life-processes and many other elements derived from the biological situation. Biological

interests, dating upwards from the crude will-to-live, become for intelligence organized values, their very preponderance during the early stages of the growth of intellect in the individual making for the basal life-establishment of humanity. Now, just as values originate from the interests of full life, so the theoretical self-apprehension of values, the moral crisis, originates in a situation of social interests that is forced upon the individual by the environment of a larger experience. Action which is the *sine qua non* of life, would be impossible on the basis of pure theory from the beginning. As conscious life starts with unquestioned interests, so intelligent life must start with unquestioned values. The *theory* of the complete moral experience, namely the categorical imperative, springs up from amidst the course of action. It is the grammar of action, although it differs from grammar in its autonomous prescriptive right. But grammar is an after-thought; men must speak, using terms expressive of many interests, before the rationalizing stage is attained that seeks to account for the structure and variations of words and sentences. The evolution of intelligence in its reciprocal environment as it develops according to values, is to be noted and grasped as the ideal re-creation and infinitely continuous intension-extension of given data. The view of totality once it has been attained, reveals the real significance of these data, but the intellect has reached its self-positing judgment in the *midst* of its activity, while experimenting with values at hand. The thought-situations of the individual are thus raised on the pedestal of the social which, in turn, stands on the base of the biological.

85. *Freedom of Valuation Through the Independence of a Moral Crisis.* Intelligence is truly born as reason when the individual becomes independent as will, taking charge of the evaluating progression of evolution. Personality recognizing itself as self-creative in experience, is manifested with the coming of the moral crisis. The categorical imperative having been discovered and self-revealed to satisfy a dominating mood of want, becomes the axis of reference, co-ordinating all values. The individual may now re-enter without danger, the bond of the non-personal, generalized, moral valuations of society. For he may retain his perfect independence, conscious that, after all is said and done, he is always expressing his autonomy. He is aware that social progress can come only by the synthesis of his personal contribution, as the offspring of his freedom.

86. *Moral Independence and Adolescence.* It probably will be accepted by all, regardless of any special theory of values, that the moral crisis forms part of the special psychology of adolescence. It is in this period that the moral attitude becomes critical, that intellectual independence commences to assert itself, and that the hunger for values makes itself inwardly felt as an acute want. The work that falls to the mental life is the critical clarification, so far as limited experience can allow, of the ready-made material of values hitherto accepted without examination. The task is one of reconstruction,—an inward evaluation of values, a deepening or intensification of the general evolutionary advancement of adjustment to ideals. It is while engaged in this task of insight that the self finds itself. Self-positing does not precede experience

but occurs in the *midst* of it. It is, in reality, the critical and theoretical apprehension of life's intelligible content under the aspect of worth. What originally may have been the ego's by the doubtful right of imitative mental images, is now its sure possession as its very own ideal.

87. *Absence of Self-Positing, a Negative Proof of Perfect Freedom.* If all men do not experience the moral crisis which is a transformation in life that comes through gradual enlightenment of the will rather than in a sudden moment of regeneration, it simply proves that the autonomy of will is so perfect, that it may refuse to exercise its freedom, and remain heteronomous for an indefinitely long time behind other free beings. But it is extremely doubtful if there is any intelligent being that has utterly abnegated his freedom. The moral crisis is the fruition of a growing sense of values; it is a complete "over-all" valuation. The sense of values is already evident, when it is acknowledged that "the good is better than the bad," and in the presence of this conviction, the hope of a moral crisis is well founded.

CHAPTER XI

THE NATURE OF CONSCIENCE

88. *Conscience the Coalescence of Social and Individual Worths.* As the social and the individual worlds coalesce in the functional activity of active apperception, forming a time-space world of relations and things, so that while the things are mine and the relations are mine, they are, nevertheless, also general; so, in like manner, the social and the individual worlds of worth coalesce in conscience. Conscience is the moral apperceptive group; it is the psychological and subjective complication of values functioning almost habitually in the moral life. It is not the sense of values in itself, but rather the gauge showing the incessant motor power of it. As a moral apperception, it is a complex of value judgments funded for use in the interpretative evolutionary experience of the individual. As psychological, it represents the beliefs that are favorable to action, (Cf. Ralph B. Perry, *Present Philosophical Tendencies,* p. 7), often based upon and following tradition when its outlook has to do with the more social aspect of values. Furthermore, it most often operates without any psychical disturbance, being the silent partner of the ordinary course of events in the ordinary development of experience. It energizes from behind the scenes, dwelling apart from the illuminated focus of consciousness. At times, its action seems to be by means of imitative mental images instead of ideals; it then seems

to be equivalent to social instincts rather than duty, justifying the definition by Darwin of "a wounded social insinct." Wherein do its dignity and greatness really consist?

89. *Conscience More than Psychological.* It must be noticed that the functioning of conscience is however, a great deal more than psychological. It is always "the whole man," the free individual who is acting, and he has simply handed over his habitual conduct to the economy of psychological processes. This is done just in order that he might retain his intellectual freedom and freshness. For when the issue involved is out of the rut of the ordinary, conscience sharply rises into the brilliant focus of consciousness and negates the action until its value has been harmonized with the general scheme of values. (Cf. § 61). It has proved the presence of the Self as the critic that has set the problem for intelligence to solve. The criticism may be repudiated in the light of conscience, but the outstanding fact remains that there has been a moral conflict, that personal evaluation is always present by means of conscience. Conduct apparently by images is really guided by ideals capable of being re-formed whenever there is need. Conscience is, then, not just instinct social or intuitive, but it is the ego itself in the inter-related development of values, setting the problems and the ends of experience, and making possible a self-created evolutionary environment.

90. *Conscience Expresses the Joy of Self-Creative Experience.* There is no such thing as conscience in the biological situation because here there is only one line of reaction; theory and ideals would embarrass and inter-

fere with the organized instinct. But in the thought-situation, the whole scheme of evolution has become the theory and the ideal of intelligence; evolution has become self-conscious and self-creative in a grand scheme of values. The ends of life are self-posited and are a subject of grave concern to the intelligence. Conscience is thus operative, not alone as theoretical moral apperception, but also as the joyous self-willing of life's activities in accordance with the preference dating from the moral crisis. (Cf. § 73). It is really the entire complex of consciousness, embodying in its ideals the hopes, the fears, the volitions, etc., of the many-sided self. Success is bound up with gladness, while thwarting or defeat, brings sorrow. The stings of conscience are provocative of real pain, while its approval means the happiness of perfect adaptation to the ever-enlarging ideal environment. Its voice may be stilled in a positive or in a negative manner, that is, its sharp negative criticism may have been funded intellectually in the harmonization that has created a new moral apperception, or the problematic value suggested by its criticism may have been repudiated and banished from the scheme of worths. In all cases, it is the free self that has registered itself in the dynamism of conscience.

91. *Conscience as the Self Acting Efficiently and Intuitively.* Conscience is sometimes minimized, especially by utilitarian schools of ethics, when they point out its plain psychological genesis in the life-history of the individual. It is shown to be originally a social emotion arising from a sense of harmony with the external environment, etc. But the irrelevancy of the psychological criticism and its metaphysical inadequacy will become evident when the

general, social background of the moral crisis is recalled. (Cf. § 84). The individual finds himself, that is, he discovers his individuality by reconstructing the world of values. His experience has only then taken the form of a world of values when he has undergone a moral crisis for himself. The self posits its supreme value amidst the turmoil and confusion of the values that it must interpret. When it formulates its moral imperative it simultaneously registers its ideal desires, its values, in conscience which thereafter functions in the name of the autonomous self. The development of conscience has been coeval with the development of the moral problem. Its activity implies the continuance, the intensification, the lastingness of that problem. The traditional honor that belongs to it is meant for the moral self. Its place may be described with the same words that Schliermacher formulates the law of duty:

> Act at every instant with all thy moral power, and aiming at thy whole moral problem. (Cf. Richard Falckenberg, *History of Modern Philosophy*, tr. A. C. Armstrong, p. 486).

If we bear in mind that conscience has a history both psychological and ethical, it would not lead to ambiguity to use the term *intuitional* of its activities. Its valuation is ordinarily immediate and out of sight of deliberative processes. The commonly accepted values, such as home, country, etc., function at once as ethical energizers of thought-situations. In fact, these concepts do not seem

to possess any genetic value-development, but to be original moral isolations forming the content of the categorical imperative. But when they are apprehended as the promptings and teachings *of* conscience (not *to* conscience) their apparent intuitional character finds a ready explanation in the sacrosanct character bestowed by universal experimentation upon certain ways of experience. They thus rise to the apparent dignity of original utterances of conscience.

92. *Conscience as the Moral Faculty.* The development of conscience as the faculty of the good may be compared to that of the aesthetic sense as the faculty of the beautiful. The latter like the former, is to all intents, an intuitive recognition. In the presence of individual instances of its expression, its genesis if there is any, has vanished. Further, if every step of its history could be retraced psychologically, there would still be no exact accounting for its preferences and verdicts. We would have to go back of the psychological to the cultural self-interpretation by intelligence of its aims and its purposes. We should then find that this "disinterested enjoyment of the beautiful," this apprehension of the "universal without the concept," (to use the expressions of Kant) is but the sensuous enjoyment of a symbolic exemplification of all the phases of the representative ideals of personality. These ideals are values within the purview of conscience as the moral self. The aesthetic faculty, the judgment of the beautiful, is really under the dominion of conscience. Both equally register the moral activity, the value-sense, of the experientially active self. Their similarity is along the lines of their co-adjutive relation; in the development

of experience, they function as phases different in kind. The aesthetic situation is rather the phase of the *settled* moral conflict.

93. *Psychological Pleasure and Moral Pleasure in Autonomous Activity.* We already have endeavored in our discussion of the genetic and social structure of autonomy and in our defence of inward qualitative possibilities in action by *Sittlichkeit,* or traditional custom, to obviate Kant's moral dilemma that would withold the appellation of duty to acts performed through inclination as well. (Cf. § 61). In the approving act of conscience, we have an illustration of just this fact of duty through pleasure and inclination. When the particular instance is more often repeated, the feeling becomes a diffused pleasure, a general inclination. The degree of the original pleasure depended on the magnitude of the problem and the intensity of the choice. Conscience in its practical aspects, is a customary "deed-thought," a habit, although a habit voluntary in its formation and in its possible re-formation. In common with all habits it must engender an element of pleasure by its very repetition. But this psychological pleasure is only the smallest part of the happiness of the moral vocation, which is indeed a moral or holy pleasure. If habitual moral action is pleasurable, it is still true that the pleasure is of the ego's own moral creation due to the successful objectification in experience of its ends bearing the coefficient of value. Though habitual repetition economizes the reproduction of the decision, the ideal is always potentially present. Conscience is always ideally ready to break or to revise its habit and to surrender its psychological pleasure for the higher pleasure of the will.

94. *Summary.* Our examination of experience has discovered an evolutionary world of ideal environment, a continuum of thought-situations reciprocal with the activity of will. The ego discovers itself amidst an unfolding reality of values and relations. But it is especially in the *value* progression of evolution that it discovers itself in the act of writing itself large. The dimensions of experience which is in itself a dichotomy of ego and non-ego, are found to be length and breadth and depth, or extension and intension, or quantity and quality. It is the qualitative aspect that is especially responsible for the living movement. Here are found the significant aims, always with a basic reference towards the self. In the quantitative aspect are found the plastic instrumentalities of experience. The relations are there, ready to function as material in the thought-situation created by value.

CHAPTER XII

VALUE AND DEITY

95. *Value Postulates Deity as a Guarantee and a Limit.* As Kant's moral philosophy postulated a deity who has perfect freedom, while the freedom of human personalities is in the process of perfection towards an infinite accomplishment, a variable infinitely approaching a limit, so the positing of value in the name of supreme value, conducts to Deity by an ontological stepping stone. Kant's postulate of Deity was necessary to support and complete the kingdom of ends of his ethical system, especially to heal the empirical breach between happiness and duty. Likewise, from the value-standpoint, the supreme value of the totality introducing a moral co-ordination into empirical values and furnishing an orderly progression towards destiny, is really meaningless without a universal personality. For the essence of value has been shown as its inclination towards subjectivity, and its ground of motivation as the monistic ideal of the whole of reality. Value is threatened with the dangers of solipsism, of a self-imposed delusion, of a moral schematism projected in desperation, of a disjointed pluralism of moral worlds, from all of which it escapes by a community of wills embracing the entirety of reality; by a moral insight into the necessary subjectivity of the totality that constitutes the ideal of the absolute evolution of experience. The constructiveness of the world of purpose attained by the

will, must be in harmony with a unified universal purpose that assures an actual value-character to reality and potential value-character to developing experience. The moral crisis is thus a recognition of self as identical in dignity and kind with universal reason; in the language of religion, it is the consciousness of soul and of God The positing of the totality is a religious act, and the projection of intelligible purpose into the maximum possibility can have reference only to God. From the point of view of religion, it is the kingdom of Heaven that has been posited, as remarked above, (Cf. § 80), implying, of course, absolute dependence on God. Thus the category of value supplies a moral-ontological approach to Deity. It is the argument that follows from the essential rationale of experience, and makes use of its analogies and its demands even including its abstract logical demands. It summarizes and is, perhaps, also in a position to correct the usual theistic arguments. While following Kant's ontological postulate of Deity which is indeed a necessity for every system of reality where the microcosm is enlarged to obtain the macrocosm, we may profitably apply his discrimination between the rational theistic arguments and the moral theistic hypothesis. (Cf. *Critique of Pure Reason,* tr. Meiklejohn, *Transcendental Dialectic,* Book II, Chapter III, Section VII). The former he criticizes on the general ground of anthropomorphism; they apply the analogy of psychological categories or formal intellectualism to universal mind. But the category of freedom which is universally operative regardless of the nature of the content, can be applied to God, without the limitation of the exclusive particularity that belongs to the other

categories. (Cf. Ralph B. Perry, *Present Philosophical Tendencies,* p. 128). It does not attempt to delimit the nature of God's experience in itself, but only conducts us to it as a universal ground of value. The conception of God as the guarantee of value in the universe, obtained by a will effort is a moral conception on the analogy of Kant's postulate of an all-powerful moral freedom harmonizing the various aspects of reality. It does not conduct us to a *deus ex machina,* an Aristotelian personification of abstract form or a Hegelian logical absolute. Such conceptions are strictly limited to the mutual functioning assigned to them in the circle of an ontological context. They are mere logical summaries projected backwards as original causation, and because of their derivation, lacking the element of freedom. Value however, projects personality into the cosmic experience in the recognition that the latter's infinite extension is exactly commensurate with and amenable to the process of infinite intension by subjectivity human and divine.

96. *The Psychological Ties of Value Cannot be Transferred to Deity.* Following a similar line of thought: Value is a process of will, whose basis is metaphysical, but whose energized activity bespeaks a psychological complex of factors. In human experience, it is by no means a simple unity, but a mixture; its treatment as ideal desire (Cf. § 34), has emphasized its complexity. We have also inferred that the ideal desire was eventually directed towards a totality, where there was hope of fulfillment. Value becomes the method of making right as a case in time in an indefeasible individual way, the purposes that belong to the right, regardless of time. . It is, therefore,

obvious that we cannot without contradiction transfer our category of value in its experiential form of a mixed complex, and thereby obtain an exact conception of God. We must delete the psychological and then we shall obtain as a remainder, the simple of free and moral, that is, purposive activity. But such an activity is unformulable and transcendent, just because our experience is indubitably complex and psychological. It is an ideal, like the perfect freedom of Kant, but is clear as a necessary ontological postulate. It is the irreducible guarantee of universal value after we have subtracted all that is irrelevant as belonging to our ego-centric world. Furthermore, the value that is inherent in God's creative work must be in the nature of an ideal directed absolutley inward, for here personality is entirely its own norm. In the moral-ontological conception of God, the value element of desire has been eliminated. God's ideals are, therefore, his reals and his purposes are simultaneously realized in the experience-extension that is evolution's creative opportunity. Man's contact which these purposes is by means of the key of value that will obtains, which does not, however, otherwise reveal the architectonic of the universe. Worth, then, as a totalizing system discovers a God who is immanent in man's creative thinking. But God is transcendent as to his own creative method, for personality in its uniqueness from the viewpoint of constitutive analysis, must always remain transcendent.

97. *The Supreme Experience is Given as to Form but not as to Content.* Value in so far as translatable into terms of an over-human experience or will, signifies the pure intelligent activity that subtends and *regards* the uni-

verse. It may still be described as ideal because this activity is not chance, but intellectually comprehensible *post facto*. The factor of desire is eliminated, as the ideal is immanent, not prospective. The philosophy of value thus reaches its conception of God, by a hypostasis of experience where supreme experience realizes the combined ideals of perfect value and perfect freedom. Like Kant's postulate of freedom, it conducts the mind to the noumenal, but does not attempt to specify the logical contexture thereof. It is content to show that it must be posited as the ground of universal method and activity.

98. *Value as Founded on a Personal, Religious Relationship.* The self-assertion or moral crisis that we have described as the activistic self-positing in a centralized scheme of worths, is thus a constructive relation not only to the universe, but also and at the same time, to God. We have called it the fundamentally religious standpoint, that of co-operation with the plans and aims of totality, realizing the kingdom of God, etc. Worth is thus a psycho-metaphysical complex, a synthesis of ideal-desire-activity. The unity of the complex from every viewpoint, is best noted in its religious aspect.

99. *God and Man Co-operate in the Extension-Intension of Experience.* Our consciousness in its moral religious career wills worth and seeks to realize it in a creative fashion. It must believe that its willing is not in vain. What then is the bearing of our value-seeking activity upon the pure universal activity that is eternally descriptive of worth? Is man's ideal a simple echo, and his activity mere acquiescence, so that at best he would duplicate what could just as well go on without him? Or is

it possible for man to counteract the universal will, making his activity in every sphere, absolutely free and absolutely creative? Or, finally, does the universal will act only as man wills, reducing itself to a logical postulate of unity deleted of all real life? The retention of both immanence and transcendence with respect to the nature of God should be a sufficient reply to the last query, which concerns itself with his actual existent character. However, we must still differentiate as to the function or place of universal will and particular wills. The delimiting distinction follows from the conception of the bi-dimensional nature of experience as opposed to the linear or surface conception. Experience which tends towards the ideal of a perfect environment reciprocal to perfect selves, is the product of both length and breadth, of extension and intension. (The spatial figure it must be recollected, is only a symbol, for the depth of experience is entirely mental, while its extension is mediated by mentality). The activity that underlies the universe, provides indefinitely for the extension of experience, for the elongation of the environment. The idealizing activity that desires value, and desiring it, discovers its latencies, its beauties, its applications, and its satisfactions; that brings to the offerings and opportunities of the universe a sense of want that justifies and fulfills them, in a word, the indefeasible, individual soul, provides further for the intension of experience adding infinite subjectivity to infinite objectivity. The development of the perfect experience and the perfect qualitative environment requires both God and man. The latter's co-operation is a real, indefeasible, contribution. He may consider himself a true

co-worker with a God who hopefully holds out to him a universal destiny.

100. *An Illustration from the Aesthetic Field.* An illustration might be adduced from the realm of art. The masterpiece of a great artist is the expression of the message of a great soul. So far, he has extended the spiritual world by a great idea. But during the course of the history of this masterpiece, the message may undergo an intensification in the world of culture, to the extent of which it will always be impossible to assign a limit. Its creative influence will be enjoyed and applied by every one who wills, although, of course, the willing is a necessary condition. It is even possible that history never will know the end of this inward intensive power, as in the case of ancient Greek art. Thus the possibility of life in art-experience is the immeasurably deep product of extension-intension. Expanding this comparison, we may imagine a work of art that is continually renewing itself with unexpected beauties. This would illustrate the continued extension of nature that science reveals, and that the philosophy of value seeks to apprehend and interpret as the materials for the intension of experience.

CHAPTER XIII

VALUES, ECONOMIC AND MORAL, AND THE CONTINUITY OF CULTURE

101. *The Differentiation of Values.* We have seen in the last chapter that the standpoint of worth is equivalent to acting under the aspect of eternity, though more in the Platonic rather than the Spinozistic sense, that is, under the aspect of the eternal, potentially expansive reals. It calls for the acting of a living, indefeasible part in the absolute evolution of humanistic experience, and results in making that evolution the reciprocal constructiveness of personality in the two-fold forms of culture and religion. The universal, ceaseless, inward activity which is life, has become self-conscious in intelligence, knowing itself as a process under the aspect of worth, constructing an environment in which the manifold elements stand ready to reveal their coefficients of value. Taking any life, any experience, any individual, we shall be able to differentiate the different kinds of values.

102. *How Values Attain the Moral Quale in the Individual.* The individual's motives, and so his life, are explicable by values. He starts his career amidst the social environment by recapitulating the cultural history of the race. (Cf. Herman H. Horne, *Idealism in Education,* p. 46). In the course of adjustment to environment which is the evolutionary task of life, he gradually learns to adjust the environment likewise to himself. This is the special evolutionary task of intelligence and involves the

moral crisis. Before this comes, the individual apparently is acting according to values that have to do with adaptation *in se,* and are, therefore, not inward but external only, and so, hypothetical or economic values. But all the while he is really acting according to the urge of a want that corresponds to the basic needs of the race. The categorical or moral values of the race, the individual at some stage of his career either adopts or rejects by a deliberate choice; by a totalizing motive or purpose of life, that imposes from within, supra-economic values upon what was before mere adjustment, and makes the adaptive relation a self-action, a harmonization of life and environment, with the ego. When worth is mere action, a mere element in the complex of a thought-situation, it is economic; when it is *my* thought and *my* action, it attains a moral *quale.* But such economic values *preceding* the self-awakening must not be confused with the silent functioning of conscience. Here in the latter, the moral issue has been settled, and the moral quale is preserved in the background of consciousness. The energizing value may *seem* to be external, because it acts so immediately, but it was originally obtained and is still modifiable by an extension of the moral crisis, and its immediacy is only the facilitation of habit.

103. *The Cultural Willing of Life.* We must, then, conclude that moral values are possible only in so far as there exists a status of culture. The act of will which indicates the real presence of the real self, is a cultural commencement of a continuous life of willing. The presence of the self as the unchangeable postulate underlying moral values, is dichotomously revealed in a state of reci-

procity with universal ends, and culture coalesces with religion. The categorical imperative always must be maintained in such a situation whose characteristic is disinterestedness. Its self-positing is that perfect willing, where freedom is pure and independent of the restraint of things in the outlining of its experience and where the environment is adapted to the self as its instrument. But culture is not one supreme achievement. It is rather a growth, and like racial history, it must pass through a struggle for the refinement of its ideals. Then, after this preparatory period, it becomes the method of the qualitative intensification of developing experience. The moral crisis indicates that the method has been accepted by the individual, that he has unified its standards and that he has definitely committed his life to its program of willing. It is now the inward aspect of value that overbalances the movement of thought-situation, and experience rises to the dignity of freedom and morality.

104. *The Continuous Self-Revision of Culture.* Furthermore, moral values not only require a condition of culture, but further impose a requirement of dynamic culture. The culture must be that of personality acting through conscience, and the place of the latter is best described in Schliermacher's conception of duty:

> Act at every instant with all thy moral power, and aiming at thy whole moral problem.

In other words, culture cannot rest on its laurels satisfied to employ a standard once and for all founded on a past or on a routine present. It must also face the future,

seeking to clarify and illustrate the content of its universal and totalizing ideal. It must recognize that morality is not the problem solved except as to the method; that it is rather the problem of problems that cannot be perfectly solved except in an infinite experience. Kant postulates "an unlimited continuation of our existence in order that by constant progress in goodness, we may draw nearer *in infinitum* to the ideal of holiness." (Cf. Richard Falckenberg, *History of Modern Philosophy,* tr. A. C. Armstrong, p. 393). The establishment of a rule that can be applied once and for all inclines towards philistinism, and will result in a mere conscientiousness rather than in culture. The latter remains the master of the content of its rules by virtue of the enlightenment of its intellect and the deepening of its whole moral problem. Morality is the qualitative aspect of evolution, and its infinite intensification testifies to the infinitude of the whole of experience. In a word, moral values depend upon a two-fold or bi-dimensional moral judgment. This must be first a valuation according to value, and then, somewhere in experience, a re-valuation of the value. It is thus that the self manifests itself as progressive activity and develops the ideal environment by augmenting the contents of conscience. Culture has relieved it from over-indulgence in the static psychological functioning of conscience, in order to make room for its dynamic and creative metaphysical functioning. Experience advances not alone by a re-relation of relations, but just as well by a re-valuation of values.

105. *Arrested Culture.* Culture and moral values not only bestow upon freedom a creative character, but make

it the *Weltanschauung* of the race, as well as of the individual growing in intellectual enlightenment. It has its stages, at every one of which there is a contemporaneous conscience. Now it may happen that the individual chooses to interrupt the continuous process of willing. In that case, a certain temporary phase of willing becomes permanent and conscience is solidified. The valuation process ceases tending towards a universalized standard. The moral dynamic tends to surrender to habituation. A will that has ceased willing may easily become the subject of arrested culture, and the self-positing amidst totality may revise itself in favor of an empirical totality and thus with an absorbing interest in mere things it may really become heteronomous. Unless culture is exercised continuously, the individual is not making a full use of his freedom, and his contribution to the totality of the extension-intension of evolution, may fail by default. Continuous willing is the price of moral values as eternal vigilance is the price of liberty.

106. *Moral Values are Cultural.* Values may thus be comprised under two general types: moral and categorical, on the one hand; and economic and hypothetical on the other hand. The former is the thread along which are strung the real events of experience. With it, the element of motive is paramount. If we seek to identify it, we do not find it in any external temporal-spatial context of life. We cannot point to any specific thing or institution and discover it in unquestioned form. We must look for it in the living act. Moral value cannot be identified until the action is studied in the light of personality. It does not belong to thing or idea of the intellect as such.

Because it is the pure motive of an indefeasible personality, tending in an indefeasible act towards an indefeasible ideal, it is uniquely non-translatable, non-interchangeable, and independent. It is then only as a living actuality that we can view the building of the kingdom of ends, not as a series of dead results.

107. *Economic Values are Impersonally Identifiable.* The values that *can* readily be identified in things or institutions or events as such, belong, on the other hand, to the economic group. Although all value bears a reference to selves, the dependence of the economic value has reached such a degree of remoteness that it can be studied impersonally and objectively. Analysis will disclose it as a factor in sociology, economics, statistics, etc. It inheres very definitely in the material of the social life whose elements it co-ordinates. It inheres in the larger world of space and time where it may become the subject matter of the mathematical sciences. Economic worths as practical factors, are not under the direct control of autonomy. They belong to the world of natural law as contrasted with the world of freedom. They are, nevertheless, the elements to which the self must accommodate itself, among which it must work out its freedom. The free act is created *de novo* when the self causes a moral value to impinge against an economic, thus utilizing the given non-personal material, but initiating or continuing a series of its own. The economic values are otherwise reduced also, by autonomy, to the function of mere factors in the process of analysis-synthesis. So far as the moral situation is concerned, they are nothing but relations of another sort transfigured into values by categories of utility. The

thought-situations themselves that provoke the dichotomy of self and ideal environment are eventuated by values that fall under the moral standard. The relation then between the two groups of values is that of aim and instrument.

108. *Ideas and Institutions as Plans of Action May Possess an Absolute Moral Value.* But are there not things, institutions, or events that in themselves possess more than economic value, that perhaps possess an undoubted moral value? If intelligence could have asked itself that question at the beginning of its evolution, it would perforce have had to answer *no*. But "an idea is a plan of action," action being basically provocative of thought, and the course of their history has very clearly established certain ideas as programs of action in consonance with the moral ideal. Their status of direct reference to the moral postulate, their motivation and their end in personality, both have conferred upon them a non-economic coefficient that is intuitively recognized as a categorical value. To this class belong those general ideas, symbolizing the acceptance of the moral ideal, which serve as moral units of ever-growing content and which men always have used as landmarks. The augmenting of the content of the moral ideal is along lines of voluntary expression and re-expression in these forms. For illustrations one has but to look into his own heart. We might also mention the concepts of religion, art, and social life. About their formal aspect there is no dispute, that is, all are agreed as to their intrinsic values, although difference of opinion arises when their content is to be filled in.

109. *Religious Symbolism Must Find Its Meaning in Absolute Values.* It is evident that certain ideas as plans of action possess an absolute moral value, because men have agreed to their status as moral symbols. A symbol has just as much meaning as we put into it, neither more nor less. There are certain ideas or institutions whose only function is to present the moral ideals of the kingdom of ends. To this class belong the institutions of religion, socially expressive of the past and present moral aspirations of the race and aiming to make the individual posit himself, first as a member of a fellowship, then, as a unique moral personality, and, finally, as an indefeasible moral factor in the grand affair of totality. Such institutions functioning originally as authority have also become spirit when they revealed their harmony with the ideals of the self. Meanwhile, they have served the function of orientating the self and directing its moral potentialities in the direction of autonomy.

110. *The Historic Method of Self-Positing Has Been Religion.* The fact that the symbols and the institutions of religion cover to the largest extent those ideas that are inextricably connected with the highest reach of the personal-environmental, ideal plans of action; with the practical moral program of life on which all thinking men are agreed, is no mere coincidence. It indicates that men have gone to the inspiration of their religious strivings for the fulfillment of the moral want, of the craving for worth, that personality implies. Religion has no other aim than to enlighten the will in the continuous succession of moral values, holding before it the grand end of purpose in a totality. It is the only department of life that deals solely

with these non-economic values *in action,* and it must be judged by a correspondent criterion. Its elements cannot be made members of an equation in which they are balanced against economic values or against relations. It should rather be considered as the efficient ally or reciprocity of culture, as the disinterested interest in the environment that creates values and makes experience truly humanistic. It should be noted also that art likewise deals with many of the same sort of values, since its cultural values have only themselves as their objects. The same self-positing is at the basis of both movements, but while art provides more for the joy of serene self-expression, religion predominates in the progressive constructiveness of experience.

CHAPTER XIV

VALUE AS PHILOSOPHY AND LIFE

111. *Value Indicates No Sixth Sense.* The philosophy of value has exalted worth to a place of unique dignity in the final evolution of life and the construction of environment. It has been made almost a partner in the work of intelligence and set up as the motive power of personality. It creates that standard of morality that makes the world of experience possess, in the phrase of Samuel Clarke, an "objective fitness." It would seem then that in the positing activity of the will and the consequent inherent emotional registration of worth, the self possessed a distinctive moral sense. But the concept of a moral sense is not without its ambiguity. If it means the "sixth sense" of Hutcheson, then it would imply a pluralism of experience with each department under its special faculty. Experience is unitary, however; it is a monism whose interlocked factors are revealed in their mutual inter-action only by a dichotomous analysis. It is discovered as the functioning of value, which is the whole mind acting in will, just as in the instrumental functioning of relation, it is the whole mind acting in intellect. The sense of values can be called a special sense only in the way that the sense of relations can be called such. The thought-situation, which is the unit of experience, attains its equilibrization or harmony both by a moral and by a strictly logical test. The thinking-process means living and developing. It is conduct. It is better, then, to consider the sense of values in the whole light of personality and its moral

crisis, rather than as innate endowment that acts regardless of personal history.

112. *Value-Content is not Final or Uniform.* Recalling that the will posits itself as the basis of value as well as its abiding method, and that the manifestations of will have an indefiniteness of variety, we shall not be prepared to find in the judgment-content of any stage of development, an infallible intuition that is not subject to modification or evolution. It is only the method that is final, the single moral hypothesis joining itself to the various intellectual hypotheses, or in other words, the method producing the value-relation construction of experience. Primitive valuation should be no more final than primitive intellection generally. If we are prepared to look for a genesis of the universally honored and accepted truths that rule in society, we must be prepared equally for a genetic point of view in the history of values. A glance at the contemporaneous thought of any period of the world's history, will furnish a convincing illustration. Men are everywhere equally devotees of religion; the totality is everywhere present in their attitude towards things. They are everywhere equally philosophers, albeit non-technical, seeking to harmonize their conceptions of the *All* with their inward reflection, and with the promptings of selfhood. Everywhere they seek as a fundamental want, to make the light of universal harmonious will, or reason, or unity, shine in and through their individual wills. Thus they lend interpretation to experience and create values. But the values are evolutionary products, and how different most of them are, in different ages, countries and climes. Not only do they show forth different

degrees of insight as far as any single value is concerned, but their very formulation differs radically in kind. Thus religion and philosophy have started from two opposite poles of development whose basic values seem mutually to cancel one another. The Orient, both in Chinese Taoism and in the various forms of Hinduism, proposes the ideal of worklessness, of external inactivity, (Cf. Chas. G. Shaw, *The Ego and its Place in the World,* p. 500), or of the mystic absorption of self in a universal, non-conscious, existence. (Cf. Wm. T. Harris, *Hegel's Logic,* p. 300). The Occident, on the other hand, is usually agreed on the fundamental, eternal value of soul or indefeasible self, and on salvation by activity of deeds as well as of thought. The various systems of mysticism that have appeared from time to time are perhaps the sympathetic bond that points to whatever intellectual synthesis is possible between East and West. The differences of worth or ideal desires have had the most practical and far-reaching evolutionary consequences, as a comparative political and cultural study would readily prove. In brief, value has a universal formative function in experience. Its apparent spontaneity in ordinary events is not an infallible sense or heritage, but rather an intuition that belongs to personal character. From the individual point of view, the content with its spontaneous functioning is the intellectually controlled residuum of a moral crisis; and from the social and religious points of view, this content will be seen to be controlled by the varying influences that enter into the psychology of the group.

113. *The Work of Self in Adapting Environment.* The philosophy of value, moreover, plunges us right into

the thick of the evolutionary process whose uninterrupted cumulative activity eventuates in this very continuum of our experience. Evolution is not solely a story of the past; it is not a genesis to be studied only in the light of accomplished end-results. It is a cosmic development whose contemporary forms in any period are the temporary stages of that development clearly marked with the lines of a unifying purpose. The essence of its continuity is not to be sought in merely organic adaptations of external structure, but rather in the positive evolution of the content of experience; in action that is inward and purposive, rather than in reaction that is outward and adaptive. The field of evolution on the basis of worth is, therefore, multiplied by the limitless extent of human consciousness. In the biological situation, evolutionary evidences have to be sought with the aid of the tools and the technique of science. In the thought-situation, they will have to be sought with the aid of philosophical reflection. In the former case, the test was adaptation to environment; in the latter, the test is rather adaptation *in* a self-constituted environment or adaptation to self. The environment is the environment of a self, and the self reciprocally is a self in its environment. Experience is a growth and a progression along the lines of their reciprocal interactivity, of which the self striving as a will illuminated by intellect, is the mould. The application of worth supplies the impetus. The filling-in with content, with temporal meaning, calls for the free and joyous obedience of the self to its own law, which is the law of its development. The joy that makes unnecessary the stoic fortitude of rigorism, rests on the fundamental fact that the self is satisfying its

ever-present dissatisfaction and want. The want is its underlying prophetic mood which eventuates in a categorical imperative and a religio-cultural standard. The environment of man becomes actual and real because his intellect needs it, because he desiderates it as a worth.

114. *The Indefeasibility and Co-operation of Selves.* Furthermore, each and every individual self can be estimated and understood only in the reciprocity of its environment which displays it in the living act of self-augmenting content. Its indefeasibility is the fact that the evolutionary drama cannot forego its contribution. Experience is constructed upon culture and turned towards religion. The former directs the self towards itself; the latter directs it towards its aims, postulating co-operative contact with other personalities. There is a qualitative differentiation of greater and lesser selves, ranging from the super-soul that really directs the vast currents of thought, down to the unthinking. The evolution of the ideal environment, the progressive history of mankind, is thus at basis founded, as Fichte would maintain, upon the adaptation of the self to other selves.

115. *The Vindication of Intelligence.* By our placing evolution in its farthest and purposive reaches within the circle of intelligence, it not only receives a field of infinite progress, but we have vindicated intelligence itself. For it has been rescued from the servile function of mere psychical apparatus. The merely psychical could be reconstructed by an analytic and quantitative examination. Bergson describes the genesis of the intellect as the instrumental carrying out of the general *élan vital,* by means of a principle of "like produces like." (*Creative Evolution,*

tr. Mitchell, pp. 52, 160). He makes intelligence a nucleus or contraction of a larger impetus, so that the activity that creates evolution is really unintelligible and is to be apprehended only by a kind of sympathetic intuition akin to the aesthetic. (Ibid., pp. 177, 191). The philosophy of worth, however, makes the instrumental functioning only an aspect of the intellect. It makes will and intellect coeval, and both of them the agencies of a positing metaphysical self, so that intelligence posits as well as settles its own problems. In describing an environment, it immediately thinks of the self, to complete the analysis.

116. *Man as the Master of Evolution.* The intellect makes man the master of evolution. While he must ever find himself in the midst of events and of social relations in order to be himself; while the dichotomy that reveals the self reveals the environment also, man is, nevertheless, in a definite sense independent of his environment. His culture gives him the power of interpretation, setting him in antithesis to his ordinary environment by enabling him to glimpse the grand totality. Worth as an ideal reduces the significance of the distinction between the empirical and the non-empirical; the latter becomes the inspiring force of the potential future that is within the purview of experience. Personality truly becomes the centrum from which radiate the continuous value-coefficients of a qualitative series. Worth thus transfers the center of gravity in evolution from things and events to self, which may then say, "Events are for me, and not I for them." The task before the self, is self-realization, first by adjustment to the rationality of the universe whose

inward purpose is opened by the key of worth, and secondly, by functioning autonomously to deepen and intensify experience as this extends itself. There is an infinity of two kinds in experience—extension and intension. It is the ever-varying product of the horizontal line of quantity and the vertical line of quality or interpretation. Personality is found in both of these lines, but in the latter specifically, its creative initiative can be observed.

117. *Value gives a Practical Theory for Life's Activities.* Finally, the discovery of the functioning of worth as both conditioning and conditioned in the evolution of experience must emphasize throughout, the practical bearing of value upon life. Value furnishes the theory upon which is built the series of ideal concepts without which belief and conduct are impossible. It is, indeed, a synthesis of the theoretical and the practical aspects of reality making each the servant of the other in the construction of the ideal world of the self. It has exalted intelligence which is found to be no mere happy accident in evolution, but a self willing its development and expressing its freedom in the inter-related manifestations of religion, art, science, and society.

118. *The Reciprocity of Individual and Society in the Intension-Extension of Experience.* Worth enables the individual to say, "My ideal moments and attitudes are significant; my love counts." It confers upon him a certain self-relation that makes him entirely self-dependent, and guarantees a self-identity that behaves, not indeed, as a mirror of the universe, but as one of its indefeasible subjects. Worth thus isolates the self in its independent individuality, but its next moment recombines

it in the reciprocity of the social situation. The act of intension by individuality finds its proper extension in social relations. The individuality of the self signifies that it is engaged in the task of formulating a contribution in its indefeasible manner. Evolution by self-adjustment cannot be but evolution by co-operation, for the adjustment or adaptation is to a cultural, idealizing self in a sphere where the moral law rules the environment.

119. *Value Constructs an Ethical Program.* Worth furnishes a practical ethical program that calls for devotion and cultivation, as does any art or any technical science. For values must be deliberately self-mediated and the soul must study and educate itself in its culture. Worth seeks to inspire the self by means of its religious ideals relating to totality and to destiny. It seeks to make the self use its autonomy in a positive constructiveness of evolutionary experience. It is a practical program and a universal program, where the former is arranged with reference to the latter. Worth teaches that a man is most truly a man when he is self-creative, that he is most truly self-creative when he builds up a personality upon a *Weltanschauung* and that his *Weltanschauung* is most truly in accord with the aim of reality when it sympathizes and harmonizes and co-operates with the universal will and intelligence whose thoughts are objectified in the rationality of evolution. The self-enlightenment brought about by the realization of worth and the consequent unification in culture of the various departments of life and knowledge, bestows a most intimate sense of active participation in reality. It makes the self a part of the world, and the world a part of it, in an inward manner unknown

to science alone. It consummately enriches the individual with a unique technique that enables him to assimilate all the data of life and of science. The essential procedure of this method is to be looked for in philosophy; while its historic and abiding power over races and men is to be found in the ideals of religion.

120. *The Category of Personality.* As the basis of a practical philosophy of life, worth with its platform that life's chief category is not that of things but of persons, furnishes a theoretical background for an inspiring belief in personality. It yields a satisfying conviction as to the lasting benefits of idealizing self-expressive activity both on the part of the individual and in social co-operation. It furnishes a ground, also, for the joy of life in the immediate experience of its personally-created manifold and progressive content. The joy may be the pleasure of aesthetic contemplation that views the moving ideal in the symbol of the static form. It may be the happiness of living the act that embodies the self-selected ideal concept. It may be the quiet unobtrusive emotion of the more drab and ordinary self-regulated course of experience that flows between the crises of life. The joy is not seldom mingled with suffering. But suffering as such is not necessarily evil and it may emphasize the intensity of the joy that is self-won. For suffering as distinguished from mere pain, is the mark of moral capability. It indicates the self's vital interest and participation in the upward overcoming struggle of the moral ideal. The nature of evil is also moral. It enters with the voluntary abatement of the vital moral interest and becomes applicable to the maladjustment that results as a consequence.

121. *Science and Religion Reconciled by Value.* Worth makes the reconciliation between religion and science, so ardently demanded by the very earnestness of personality, more than just a truce, more than a neighborly contiguity of closed systems. They are proved to be mutually involved, complementary, and constructive aspects of experience. Both represent formative agencies of life and knowledge. Life seeks the values offered by the one and the relations brought by the other, the motivation of the one in "deed-thoughts" and the clarification of the other in the analysis-synthesis of content. Each side of life is corrected and stabilized by the other. The tendency to formalistic externalism that confronts religion and science when they are tempted to separate their theory from the actualities of life, is effectively curbed in each case by the claims of the other. Furthermore, the realm of religious faith is removed from the danger of formalism which would threaten a faith that rested on simple intellectual acquiescence. Belief is not made to rest upon mere past eventhood, but upon the knowledge and the most solemn recognition and application of worth. Religion must substantiate its claim as value. It is the very spirit of the age that demands at least a practical and present-day-world test for religion, though its non-experiential reach may be fully allowed.

In a word, worth requires that every personality should, like the monads of Leibnitz's Monadology, reflect the world; but it also requires that, by virtue of its indefeasible selfhood, it should refract the world as well, and thus modify the further reflection possible to itself and to every other monad.

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